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RÉSUMÉ 
Noam Chomsky défend depuis longtemps une conception de la faculté du langage 
voulant que celle-ci ait des assises biologiques. Néanmoins, son implication dans les 
débats entourant l'évolution de la faculté du langage est chose récente. Il défend la 
position que le langage aurait évolué par une saltation : en d'autres mots, il serait 
apparu grâce à un seul changement génétique, et n'aurait pas été le fruit d'une 
adaptation pour la communication. Le travail qui suit examine et critique les 
arguments mis de l' avant par Chomsky pour supporter cette idée depuis son entrée 
dans le débat. Sa première contribution explicite à ce sujet (Hauser, Chomsky et 
Fitch, 2002) propose que la seule caractéristique du langage qui lui est propre est la 
récursion. L' article propose que, puisqu'on retrouve toutes les autres propriétés du 
langage soit dans d' autres aspects de la cognition humaine soit dans d ' autres espèces, 
il s'ensuit que la récursion est le seul élément qui a dû évoluer spécifiquement pour le 
langage. Un examen approfondi de cette proposition soulève deux problèmes 
majeurs: la récursion n'est jamais définie, et l' algorithme qui doit instancier cette 
récursion n' est jamais spécifié. Chomsky a subséquemment publié des articles 
(Chomsky, 2010; Berwick & Chomsky, 2011) où ces problèmes sont résolus en 
faisant appel aux découvertes faites dans le cadre du Programme Minimaliste, sa 
théorie linguistique la plus récente. Après un bref aperçu de ce Programme, les 
prémisses et les conclusions de son travail récent à propos de l' évolution du langage 
sont examinées pour montrer comment elles appuient son approche saltationiste. Une 
telle étude révèle où se situent les failles potentielles de la proposition, ce qui permet 
de démontrer que le scénario saltationiste n ' est pas justifié adéquatement, même sans 
sortir du paradigme du Programme Minimaliste. Finalement, je présente un scénario 
gradualiste de l' évolution du langage utilisant les mêmes mécanismes que ceux 
proposés par Chomsky, montrant ainsi qu 'une telle approche est plus plausible que 
l'alternative saltationiste. 
Mots-clés : évolution du langage, Programme Minimaliste, biolinguistique, 
saltationisme 
ABSTRACT 
Noam Chomsky has long argued for the biological basis of our species' language 
faculty, but has only recently involved himself in debates surrounding language 
evolution. His position is that language evolved through a saltation: in other words, 
language appeared in a single evolutionary step, and was not the result of adaptation 
for communication. This paper follows and criticizes the arguments advanced by 
Chomsky to defend this claim since his entry into the debate. His views were first 
made explicit in Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002), wherein it is proposed that the 
sole characteristic of language differentiating it from other cognitive capacities in 
humans and animals is recursion. This implies that it is the only property that needed 
to have evolved specifically for language. A thorough review and critique of the 
article shows that it suffers from two major setbacks: a lack of definition of recursion, 
and the fact that the algorithm instantiating the recursion in question remains 
unspecified. Chomsky later published additional articles which resolved these issues 
(Chomsky, 2010; Berwick & Chomsky, 2011), drawing on findings in the Minimalist 
Pro gram, his latest linguistic theory. After a brief overview of the Pro gram, the 
premises and conclusions of his most recent work on language evolution are 
scrutinized, which defend a saltationist account of the evolution of the language 
faculty. This also reveals certain flaws in the argument, allowing me to argue that the 
saltationist scenario· is unwarranted, even when one takes at face value the findings 
within the Minimalist Program. I conclude by proposing a gradualist scenario to 
demonstrate that it is more plausible than the saltationist account. 
Keywords: language evolution, Minimalist Program, biolinguistics, saltationism 
INTRODUCTION 
Study into the evolution of the human language faculty logically ought to draw on 
findings in contemporary linguistics. Starting in the mid-twentieth century, thanks in 
no small measure to the work of Noam Chomsky, the field of linguistics changed its 
focus from the structural regularities found in languages to the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms which allow language comprehension and production. Chomsky argued 
in a famous debate with Piaget (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) that this capacity should be 
understood as a "language organ" assumed to be common to all human beings. The 
fact that the human species is endowed with a biological mechanisms for human 
language should not be controversial : it is evident that only humans communicate 
using human words, syntax, phonology and the whole gamut of mechanisms that 
humans use to produce language. This is not to say that other species do not 
communicate, nor even that they do not have their own "language"; it implies merely 
that humans have their own species-specific language, which, taken as a whole, is 
inaccessible to other species. No matter how much you may talk to your dog or your 
plants, they will never answer using a sentence in English (or Hindi or Inuktitut. . . ). 
· The present investigation generally uncritically takes for granted much of Chomsky' s 
framework regarding the study of language, but, as will be clear, does so in an effort 
to reveal certain flaws when it is applied to language evolution. When speaking of 
"language evolution" in this context, it is important to understand that this research is 
specifically about the biological evolution of the capacity for language as found in the 
human species. From a "Chomskyan" perspective, the interest of the research is not to 
study a general capacity for communication, including as it would "body language'', 
social norms, prescriptive grammar, and perhaps even any information-conveying 
mechanism in any biological entity. Such a delineation would be far too broad, not to 
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mention that to systematically address all the relevant mechanisms in a uniform 
manner may be (near) impossible (Chomsky, 2011). The cultural evolution of 
specific languages is also set aside; different cultures have produced a wide variety of 
languages, and disciplines such as historical linguistics have much to say about the 
spread, interactions, and development of particular languages. Culture may moreover 
play an important role in providing feedback to biological mechanisms, in a process 
called gene-culture co-evolution (Lai and & Brown, 2011 , chap. 7), or niche-
construction theory (Bickerton, 2009a, pp. 98-105). Chomsky however has 
maintained a strict seperation between the biological aspects of language-those 
which concem him-, and those stemming from culture, or the environment more 
generally (Chomsky, 2005). His research therefore investigates the faculty of 
language, and not the plurality of languages, or a language in particular. Of course 
this very restrictive delineation of the object of study is by no means adopted by ail 
researchers of language evolution, as will be shown shortly. But for the present 
research, 1 propose to provisionally adopt Chomsky's approach to better show its 
internai inconsistencies. With this in mind, 1 will be using the expressions "language 
evolution" and "evolution of language" to refer to the evolution of the biological 
capacity of language in the human species. 
Interestingly, despite Chomsky's emphasis on ties between language and biology, for 
the greater part of his career he seemed reluctant to delve into the issue of language 
evolution. Until 2002, most of his comments on the matter were noncommittal 
statements to the effect that it is "hard to imagine a course of selection that could 
have resulted in language" ( quoted in Kenneally, 2007, p. 39) 1, with the implied 
1 This quotation is curiously not attributed to a specific publication in Kenneally's book, though it may 
corne from an interview conducted by Kenneally. See Botha ( 1998) for an in-depth review of quo tes 
by Chomsky pre-2002 about his view of language evolution. Aliquotes are qualified and no specific 
argument or conclusion is clearly present, although the general sentiment seems to be that expressed in 
Kenneally ' s passage. 
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conclusion that there is little of interest to say about language evolution. As has often 
been pointed out, the study of the evolution of the faculty of language is notoriously 
difficult because of a general lack of evidence. Language does not leave fossils , and 
evidence must therefore be inferred from our knowledge of the contemporary 
language faculty, reverse engineering of linguistic capacities, comparative studies of 
proto-linguistic capacities found in other species, as well as extrapolations from 
archaeological findings of cultural artefacts. But it is very difficult to make accurate 
inferences from this type of research and such an endeavour can easily lead to "Just-
So stories" about language evolution: stories that sound nice, maybe even plausible, 
but are not truly supported by any hard evidence. It has become almost hackneyed for 
works such as this one to mention the 1866 ban on publications about the evolution of 
language by the Société Linguistique de Paris and the Philological Society of London, 
typically thought to be in reaction to the proliferation of unfounded and indeed 
unfalsifiable speculations about the origins of language2. That sentiment is still 
present to this day, notably echoed in Lewontin' s (1998) pessimistic argument that 
there is much, if not all, of the evolution of cognition which we will never be able to 
exp Iain. 
Nevertheless, many researchers from diverse fields have disregarded such pessimistic 
arguments and have developed various approaches to the evolution of language. 
Earlier in the twentieth century, Leroi-Gourhan (1964) argued from neuro-
physiological and archaeological evidence that bipedalism had the significant effect 
of freeing the hands and face for fine motor use. The development oftool-making and 
speaking would have developed in parallel, reinforcing one another. More recently, 
2 But cf Cohen 's (2013) "Historical , Darwinian, and current perspectives on the origin(s) of language'', 
Lefebvre, Claire, Bernard Comrie and Henri Cohen (eds.), New Perspectives on the Origins of 
Language. xvi, 582 pp. (pp. 3-30) wherein he argues that at least in the case of the Société 
Linguistique de Paris, the ban may have been the result of political and sectorial pressures rather than 
considerations regarding the value of such work. 
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Philip Lieberman, a cognitive scientist with a background in phonetics, has studied 
the motor control and cognitive fonctions involved in speech production, including 
data regarding the human species ' vocal tract length. According to his research, the 
length is unique in allowing the production of our human phonemic repertoire 
(Lieberman, Klatt, & Wilson, 1969). He also looked into the interaction of various 
parts of the cerebral cortex, arguing that the idea of a "language organ", or module, is 
erroneous. Our capacity for language is instead the result of interactions of various 
parts of the brain also implicated in other capacities, which were mostly already 
present in our primate ancestors (cf. Lieberman 2002). Along similar lines, Sue 
Savage-Rumbaugh and her collaborators (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin: 1994; 
Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker & Taylor: 1996, 1998) work on primate research, 
teaching human language to bonobos in an attempt to demonstrate the similarities 
between humans and one of the most closely related species to humans. If apes could 
be shown to learn language in the same way we do, it would suggest continuity in 
cognitive capacities between humans and apes, implying that human linguistic 
capacities are not unique to humans, merely more developed versions of primate 
cognition. She claims that some of her bonobos have successfully acquired human 
language. Her research is however contradicted by Terrace's (1979) work with the 
(then) famous Nim Chimpsky, a chimpanzee raised in a human family and taught 
sign language; despite learning some vocabulary, Nim never spontaneously created 
complete grammatical sentences. 
One of the most influential articles in the field of linguistics was Steven Pinker and 
Paul Bloom's (1990) "Natural Language and Natural Selection", in which they 
explicitly argued against what they perceived to be Chomsky ' s position on language 
evolution. In the article they argue that "language is no different from other complex 
abilities such as echolocation or stereopsis, and that the only way to explain the origin 
of such abilities is through the theory of natural selection" (1990, p. 3). Pinker & 
Bloom further hypothesize that language would have evolved for the purpose of 
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communication, with gradua! changes being the fruit of natural selection for this 
capacity (ibid, p. 14). Others have. proposed specific capacities or selection pressures 
which would have accounted for the origin of language. For instance Bickerton 
(2009a) proposes that displacement-the capacity to refer to things outside our 
immediate perception-would have been the first ingredient for the development of 
language. Dunbar (1996) hypothesises that language replaced grooming as a form of 
social bonding in our ancestors when our communities became too large to allow for 
sufficient grooming time between each individual. Despite these and many other 
proposals regarding the evolution of language, none of these arguments seemed to 
hold sway over Chomsky, who stayed surprisingly mute on such matters. 
All this changed when in 2002, Chomsky coauthored an article with two evolutionary 
biologists, Marc D. Hauser and Tecumseh Fitch, for Science: "The Faculty of 
Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?" In this paper Chomsky' s 
views on language evolution were finally made explicit. Meant to facilitate 
interdisciplinary communication, the article proposed a distinction between the 
Faculty of Language - Broad (FLB) and the Faculty of Language - Narrow (FLN). 
Whereas FLN contains all the biological components that are unique to human 
language and to the human species, FLB contains FLN as well as the components 
which contribute to the language capacity, but are also found in other parts of 
cognition or in other species. The authors further hypothesized that the only thing that 
satisfies the uniqueness condition is "recursion"-a term which was unfortunately 
never explicitly defined in the article. This, it is implied, justifies a saltationist 
approach to the evolution of language. As will be explained in more detail in chapter 
I, in biology a saltation (from the latin "saltus", leap) is a sudden, atypical change in a 
species over a single generation, as opposed to the more common graduai change 
generally expected through slight variation and natural selection. The argument 
advanced by Hauser et al. (2002) to justify this approach is that the parts of language 
which are not unique to language would have already been in place (since they are 
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present in other species) allowing recursion-ostensibly a very simple mechanism-
to appear and act as a keystone to all other components, effectively uniting all the 
parts necessary for a fully functioning language capacity in one step. Furthermore, 
according to the authors, if whatever satisfies the uniqueness condition is indeed that 
restricted, it "has the interesting effect of nullifying the argument from design" (2002, 
p. 1573). In other words, since such a simple mechanism simply cannot appear in 
more than a single step, it could not be the result of successive steps of natural 
selection, shaping it to its use in language. The hypothesis that it is not the fruit of 
adaptation also suggests that it may be the result of non-evolution-related constraints 
that may be present in neurological architecture. 
This article is critically assessed in chapter I, where I rev1ew and clarify the 
arguments sketched above, as well as detail some of the criticisms it has drawn. After 
a brief overview of central concepts to evolutionary biology, the FLB/FLN distinction 
is examined. I argue that rather than facilitating cross-disciplinary communication, it 
may have caused more confusion than anything else. I then turn to the sole 
component hypothesized to be in FLN: recursion. Various definitions ofrecursion are 
explored, showing that since no definition is given in the article, what the authors 
meant is far from obvious. After a review of two previous critiques of the recursion-
as-FLN hypothesis, I propose a critique of my own which, unlike the two previous 
ones, has the advantage of not relying on a change of theoretical framework or on 
empirical data, but simply the conceptual -clarification of the term "recursion" and its 
place within FLN. This approach reveals that if no specific recursive algorithm is 
specified for FLN, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch ' s hypothesis is doomed to remain 
inconclusive and thus contributes very little to the debate. 
After 2002, Chomsky penned additional articles, developing his view of language 
evolution, emphasizing his saltationist and non-adaptationist account. In these 
articles, he bases much of his argument on findings in the Minimalist Program, the 
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most recent generative linguistics paradigm for the study of language. The Minimalist 
Pro gram attempts to reconcile linguistics and biology, "forc[ing] linguists to 
reformulate previous findings in terms of elementary units, operations and interface 
conditions" (Di Scullio & Boeckx, 2011 , p. 4) in the hopes that such simplified 
mechanisms would more easily be found through biology. As will be explained in 
greater detail in chapter II, the Minimalist Program postulates a single syntactic 
process "Merge", which joins two lexical units (words or previous outputs of Merge ), 
ensuring grammaticality thanks to lexical features on the units, in a process called 
"feature-checking" . Simplifying to the utmost, lexical units have features, for instance 
the feature [+f], which need to be rnatched by another unit in the Merge operation, in 
this case a lexical unit with the feature [-f]; successive applications ofMerge continue 
until all features are checked, resulting in a well-formed sentence (Berwick, 2011 , p. 
87). In Chomsky's writings, Merge has corne to replace recursion as the uniquely 
human linguistic capacity, rebutting some of the critiques levelled at the Hauser et al. 
(2002) article. It will however become clear that his approach offloads the 
computational complexity onto the lexical features, seemingly allowing Merge to be 
the simple algorithm needed for the saltationist argument. As will be shown, 
Chomsky' s reliance on the Minirnalist prograrn effectively resolves the critiques 
levelled at him in chapter 1, but opens him up to other critiques formulated in chapter 
III. 
Researchers have rejected Chomsky ' s ideas regarding the evolution of language on 
many fronts. Needless to say, his saltationist and non-adaptationist conclusions are 
often viewed unfavourably, but few have been able to point out inherent problems 
within Chomsky' s account. Sorne will invoke previously formulated alternative 
hypotheses, often developed by researchers outside the field of linguistics, 
approaching the question from another angle (see for instance the research mentioned 
earlier by Lieberrnan et al. , 1969, Lieberman 2002; Dunbar, 1996; Savage-Rumbaugh 
& Lewin, 1994; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. , 1996, 1998). Others will accept Chomsky' s 
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approach to linguistics in general, but argue that the empirical evidence does not---or 
likely will not in the future- support his theories (cf. Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005 ; 
Jackendoff & Pinker, 2005; Bickerton 2009b, 2009c). In chapter III, I propose instead 
to argue from within Chomsky' s framework and reveal through careful examination 
that his theory contains certain inconsistencies. I argue that Chomsky' s new approach 
fails because it must disregard the use of lexical features in order to maintain its 
saltationism. I explore in greater detail the explicit saltationist arguments as found in 
Chomsky (2010) and Berwick & Chomsky (2011) to show that the appearance of 
lexical units is assumed to have happened before Merge. As has been remarked · 
explicitly or implicitly in a handful of articles (cf. Bickerton, 2009b; Jackendoff, 
2010; Boeckx 2011; Clark, 2013), but not fully fleshed out into a strong argument, 
the evolution of lexical items and features is a major stumbling block for Chomsky' s 
saltationist argument. I argue that it is more plausible for Merge to have developed 
much earlier, with lexical features arriving later and developing gradually, eventually 
allowing for the linguistic competence we now have. 
Through careful examination of the premises and arguments advanced by Chomsky 
and his co-authors, I will demonstrate that Chomsky' s arguments for language ' s 
development through saltation fail to capture the implications of the various 
interacting mechanisms of language that he himself proposes. In so doing, I show 
that his theory is at best incomplete, and at worst incoherent. It furthermore suggests 
that if the Minimalist Program is to have a strong impact on language evolution 
debates, more research is required into the relation between words , concepts, and 
lexical features, a path which has the potential to lead to a more plausible, intuitive, 
and gradualist account of language evolution. 
CHAPTERI 
THE "RECURSION-ONL Y" HYPOTHESIS 
1.1. Concepts of evolution 
Before delving into language evolution proper, a few of the central concepts of 
evolutionary theory must be defined in order to properly situate the discussion in 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002; henceforth HCF) and Chomsky's writings. 
Interestingly however, many of the discussions on language evolution that will be 
surveyed in this paper do not engage in significant ways with much of the work in 
biology or the conceptual distinctions proposed in the philosophy of biology3. This is 
undoubtedly a lacuna, as many arguments rely on sometimes poorly understood 
principles of evolutionary biology, especially in the articles Chomsky has published 
after his work with Hauser and Fitch (see chapter III). In any case, no matter the 
accuracy with which it is deployed by Chomsky or others, background knowledge of 
central and relevant themes in evolution is necessary to properly understand the 
issues and arguments pertaining to language evolution. 
Because this thesis focuses specifically on Chomsky's theoretical framework, 1 will 
mostly be relying on concepts he himself has used, namely exaptation and 
saltationism, which are, for the most part, sufficient for the purposes of my critiques. 
3 Other sources of course do approach the issue from the biological perspective, but they generally do 
not engage directly with the work done by Chomsky, and therefore rarely meet on common ground. 
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1.1 .1. Adaptation 
Evolution is "the theory of the change of organic species over time" (Sloan, 2010). 
Lewontin has characterized our contemporary understanding of evolution through 
three necessary building blocks of evolution : (1) variations in morphologies, 
physiologies and behaviour ("phenotypic variation"), which leads to (2) varying rates 
of survival and reproduction ("differential fitness"), which must also be (3) heritable 
("fitness is heritable") (Lewontin, 1970, p. 1 ). Acting upon these mechanisms is 
natural selection, famously proposed by Darwin (1859), which will tend to eliminate 
those organisms with the least fitness , leading to change in the population over time. 
The typical assumption within the theory of evolution is that traits which are present 
in a species are adaptations. (However this assumption is sometimes faulty, as will be 
shown in the next section.) Adaptations are traits that have been favoured by natural 
selection (Laland & Brown, 2011 , p. 92), meaning that they are adapted to a specific 
environment, or niche. 
1.1.2. Exaptation 
Y et not all traits are selected for. Williams (1966), an influential evolutionary 
biologist, stated that "adaptation is an onerous concept that should be used only 
where it is really necessary" (p. 4 ). In the same vein, Gould and Lewontin (1979) in 
their well-known article "The Spandrels of San Marco" argue that evolutionary 
biologists too often assume that the only explanation for any given trait is that it is an 
adaptation. Many factors other than adaptation can explain the presence of a given 
trait, such as architectural constraints (p.15), by-products of other adaptations, 
otherwise known as spandrels (pp. 2-3), or genetic drift (p.10) among others. Gould 
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and Vrba (1982) coined the term "exaptation" to refer to a trait which contributes to 
the fitness of an organism without having been selected for that specific fonction. 
An exaptation is a trait that is currently useful for a given fonction, but whose 
historical development is not (at least not exclusively) the result of selection for that 
fonction. In the words of Gould and Vrba: "such characters, evolved for other usages 
(or no fonction at all), and later "coopted" for their current role, [are] called 
exaptations" (1982, p. 6). For example, the development of feathers in birds 
apparently happened before flight, implying that feathers could not have developed as 
an adaptation for flight, despite their obvious contemporary importance with respect 
to that fonction. Gould and Vrba mention a few hypotheses regarding their origin, 
such as the possibility that they developed for insulation, only later being exapted for 
flight (ibid. , p. 7). Note that this does not exclude the fact that feathers or any other 
exaptation could have subsequently evolved for that new fonction, only that at some 
point previously in the trait's development, it was not selected for the current 
fonction. Exaptations and adaptations are thus not mutually exclusive. 
1.1.3. Gradualism versus saltationism 
Another typical assumption within the theory of evolution is that changes within a 
population happen gradually. Darwin believed that "Natura non facit saltum'', which 
is to say that evolutionary change must happen in small successive steps rather than 
great leaps. He even stated that " if it could be demonstrated that any complex organ 
existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight 
modifications, my theory wçmld absolutely break down. " (Darwin 1859, p. 189) For 
Darwin, and indeed in the mind of many, evolution must be the result of slight 
variations in successive generations. 
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But Darwin's gradualism came under fire by saltationists as soon as it was proposed. 
Even his supporter Thomas Huxley, "Darwin's bulldog", warned him in a letter that 
he had loaded his work "with an unnecessary difficulty in adopting 'Natura non facit 
saltum' so unreservedly" (Huxley, 1859). The debate continues into the twentieth 
century, with Richard Goldschmidt (1940, paraphrased in Gould 1980) proposing that 
every so often, a great mutation will produce a "hopeful monster", which may lead to 
a rapid, discontinuous change from one generation to the next. This idea is later 
defended by Stephen Jay Gould, who ex plains Goldschmidt' s idea in the following 
way: 
new species arise abruptly by discontinuous variation .. . every once in a 
while a macromutation might, by sheer good fortune, adapt an organism 
to a new mode of life, a "hopeful monster" in his terminology. 
Macroevolution proceeds by the rare success of these hopeful monsters, 
not by an accumulation of small changes within populations. (Gould, 
1980, p. 24) 
Gould then goes on to illustrate the success of such an approach through examples of 
species which have features that purportedly allow for no intermediate graduai steps. 
For instance, a certain genera of boid snakes have a movable joint in the center of the 
upper jaw, which seems to have no possibility for graduai adaptation: "How can a 
jawbone be half broken?" (Gould, 1980, p. 26) This is precisely the type of argument 
invoked by HCF and later Chomsky for their saltationist claims. 
Saltationism is often associated with speciation and punctuated equilibrium, but that 
association is not fully warranted in either case. As testified by the quotation in the 
previous paragraph, saltations can accow1t for speciation, but speciation can also 
happen through graduai evolution, for instance in the case where a given population 
is segregated from another for long enough that the graduai changes amount to a new 
species. Punctuated equilibrium is a theory that proposes that those graduai changes 
. that lead to speciation typically happen in bursts (on a geological timescale) rather 
than slow accumulation of slight changes (Gould & Elderedge, 1977). Although the 
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changes leading from one species to the next are thought to be rapid, they are 
nevertheless gradual and not saltational (Gould, 2002). Saltations thus do not equate 
with speciation, although they are one way in which it may happen. 
The discontinuous changes proposed by saltationists are generally not the result of a 
great overhaul in the genes. Instead, it is thought that small changes in genotype can 
result in qualitatively large changes in the phenotype. Thiessen (2009) defines 
saltational evolution as "a genetic modification that is expressed as a profound 
phenotypic change across a single generation and results in a potentially independent 
lineage" (Theissen, 2009, p. 46). Saltations are thus not thought to arise through large 
genotypic changes, which would be highly improbable, but rather through small 
changes that in volve large effects. Y et as Shapiro (2011) demonstrates, even 
genotypic variation is not as simple as was once believed: "our view of genome 
change has become one that describes active cell processes rather than a series of 
random accidents." (p . 129) Shapiro calls these processes 'natural genetic 
engineering', which "range from horizontal gene transfers and the movement of 
transposable elements through chromosome rearrangements to whole genome 
duplications and cell fusions." (p. 128) These new discoveries in genetics, coupled 
with the possibility that small genotypic changes can lead to great phenotypic 
transformations, show that "clear evidence exists for abrupt events of specific kinds at 
all levels of genome organisation." (Shapiro, 2011 , p. 128). 
The defenders of the saltationist approach all concede that the traditionally upheld 
small incremental changes exist, but nevertheless attribute a non-negligible role to 
saltational events. As Theissen (2009) explains: "Advocates of these views often do 
not completely deny gradual changes (typically during adaptation or microevolution), 
but consider them unable to explain the origin of phenotypic novelties, or species and 
higher order taxa." (p. 44) For some, such as Gould, the role of saltation should not 
be overstated : "my own betting money goes on a minor and infrequent role" (Gould 
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2002, p. 1146, quoted in Clark, 2013 , p. 182). However as Chouard (2010) has 
written in a news feature in Nature , other saltationists believe that "single-gene 
changes that confer a large adaptive value do happen: they are not rare, they are not 
doomed and, when competing with small-effect mutations, they tend to win." (p. 864) 
One way or the other, saltations seem to be more and more accepted as a plausible 
evolutionary scenario, at least in certain cases. 
As shall be shown in the next section, Chomsky and his collaborators argue that 
language was made possible by the appearance of recursion, which allowed the 
exaptation of the various cognitive mechanisms which comprise the faculty of 
language (FLB). Insofar as such a minor novelty (recursion) is expected to have 
yielded such a drastic change in cognitive capacities (language), the approach can be 
labelled saltationist. The approach is then justified through an argument similar to 
that advanced by Gould (1980): recursion (defined in section 1.4) cannot be half 
there; it is either present or it is not, implying that it can only appear in a single step. 
1.2. FLN/FLB distinction 
1.2.1. The distinction defined 
As mentioned earlier, the study of the evolution of the faculty of language is 
interdisciplinary as language itself calls upon so many aspects of the human organism 
for its implementation. With so many different disciplines involved, clashes between 
theoretical frameworks and misunderstandings about the definitions of terms are 
bound to happen. At the very center of many misunderstandings has been the most 
fundamental term itself: "language". No consensus exists regarding its definition: for 
instance, for some linguists language is defined as the computational mechanisms 
internai to an individual organism, whereas others argue that language cannot be 
15 
divorced from the context in which it is used; for anthropologists or psychologists it 
is often synonymous with human communication in general. Reacting to this 
perceived problem, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (HCF 2002, Fitch, Hauser and 
Chomsky 2005; henceforth FHC), propose and refine a distinction ostensibly meant 
to facilitate cross-disciplinary study of the evolution of language. The faculty of 
language is thus divided into the two following conceptions: 
(i) FLB, Faculty of Language -Broad, is the group of organism-internal systems 
used for the production and comprehension of language. FLB also includes 
within it FLN. 
(ii) FLN, Faculty of Language - Narrow, is the subset of mechanisms in FLB 
which are uniquely human, and unique to language. 
This conceptual distinction is intended to clarify which aspects of language different 
researchers are focusing on, and defuse any arguments about whether language ought 
to be defined as communication or as mental computations. As HCF point out: 
"many acrimonious debates in this field have been launched by a failure to 
distinguish between these problems" (p.1569). Thus, not only is this distinction made 
to facilitate communication across disciplines, it allows researchers to continue their 
respective research programs without treading on each other' s toes. But though this 
distinction may be 'politically' savvy, Churchland (1986) has argued that such an 
approach may not always be in the best scientific interest. She maintains that in the 
case of neuroscience and psychology, the disciplines ought not be conceived as 
tunnelling through a mountain from opposite ends with the objective of meeting one 
another "because the co-evolution [of the disciplines] typically is far more interactive 
than that, and involves one theory' s being susceptible to correction and 
reconceptualization at the behest of the cohort theory." (Churchland, 1986, p. 373) 
The same argument applies to any disciplines which work on the same broad issues, 
as is the case with language evolution. However the distinction is meant to do more 
than simply resolve differences between disciplines: it is also intended as a guide to 
empirical research across disciplines. 
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Indeed, the interest in the delineation of FLN is also to isolate what it is that humans 
possess which allows us to have language as we do. Since no other animal is able to 
communicate with human language, it is clear that humans possess certain capacities 
which are not found in any other species. Although HCF propose contents for FLN 
(discussed Jater), the authors do remark in the subsequent article that FLN "could 
possibly be empty, if empirical findings showed that none of the mechanisms 
involved are uniquely human or unique to language, and that only the way they are . 
integrated is specific to human language." (FHC, 2005, p. 181) The conceptual 
distinction between FLB and FLN thus raises the question as whether there are 
uniquely human and linguistic capacities and what those capacities are. This in turns 
leads to theoretical and empirical investigations regarding how and when they might 
have appeared in our lineage. The interest in FLN is therefore not a hubris-inspired 
hunch about human exceptionality, but rather an evolutionary-minded question about 
human-specific adaptations. 
1.2.2. FLB and its contents 
HCF not only propose the FLN/FLB distinction, but also put forward hypotheses 
about the contents of each, starting with FLB. As defined above, they propose that 
FLB includes FLN, but also "at least two other organism-internal systems, which we 
call "sensory-motor" and "conceptual-intentional"" (p.1570-71). Since both these 
systems are assumed to not be unique to language and humans, HCF point out some 
promising research in comparative biology in these areas. Regarding the role of the 
sensory-motor system, HCF applaud research done into vocal imitation and invention 
in songbirds or dolphins, constraints imposed on vocal tract anatomy in primates, or 
the capacity for discrimination of sound patterns in language (p. 1573). The 
conceptual-intentional system for its part involves such aspects as theory of mind and 
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concept acquisition, with research clone on the seeing/knowing distinction in 
chimpanzees, referential vocal signs in primates, and intentional communication (for 
a complete list of the research commended by HCF, see Table 1, p.1573). HCF also 
leave open the possibility that there may be other systems to be included. Although 
these two systems are not accepted by all as discrete modules within the mind (see 
e.g. the work in cognitive linguistics: Croft & Cruse, 2004), HCF maintain that these 
systems which they include in FLB internet in various ways, accounting for human 
language production and comprehension. 
The FLN/FLB distinction may seem fairly straightforward at first glance, but begins 
to seem a little more confusing when the authors propose that there are parts of the 
organism which play a supporting role in language production and comprehension, 
but still don't make it into FLB. According to their conceptualization, FLB "excludes 
other organism-internal systems that are necessary but not sufficient for language 
(e.g. , memory, respiration, digestion, circulation, etc.)." (HCF 2002, p. 1571) The 
exclusion of these systems is somewhat intuitive insofar as it is easy to recognize 
that, for instance, respiration does not play a pivotal role in language production or 
comprehension (especially when sign language is taken into account). Furthermore, 
one does want to find a way to exclude parts of the organism that are clearly 
irrelevant, such as the immune system or a sense of balance. But the characterization 
of these parts as "necessary but not sufficient for language" is inadequate, since any 
of the other parts of FLB taken in isolation, including FLN, is necessary but not 
sufficient for language (since it is taken for granted that it is only through their 
interaction that we produce language ). It furthermore cannot be that all the contents 
of FLB as understood by HCF are sufficient for language, since clearly memory at the 
very least is necessary. 
If it is confusing to decide what should be excluded from FLB, it is aise difficult to 
settle on the conceptual basis for inclusion in FLB. Necessity and sufficiency do not 
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seem to be the appropriate boundaries for the conceptual distinction if the boundaries 
are to be drawn where HCF intended them to be. Not only does it give rise to the 
problems above, it also proves difficult to use when one tries to distinguish which 
parts of the sensory-motor systems are recruited. For instance, sign language does not 
involve auditory channels or articulatory muscles, and vocalized language can do 
without visual eues. What does it mean then to say that the sensory-motor system is 
part of FLB? What must be intended is some abstraction of the particulars of the 
sensory-motor system, or perhaps some sort of high-level conversion of the outputs 
of the other language-faculty modules to whatever motor output is recruited (and 
presumably the same thing the other way around for the input) . Nevertheless, it is 
perhaps legitimate to speak of the sensory-motor system generally without having to 
specify the particulars if we assume that there are processes that will be recruited no 
matter the medium used to communicate. But the question remains: which specific 
parts of the sensory-motor system should be included within FLB? One can hope that 
the distinction will serve precisely to clarify such questions, leading to empirical 
research regarding specific aspects of the systems in FLB which are recruited, in 
which case a certain amount of vagueness in its delineation is warranted, and 
assumed to be temporary. 
In any case, since the focus of the present work is specifically about the saltationist 
argument regarding language evolution, which itself relies on FLN and its contents , 
the problems concerning FLB's unclear delineation need not be resolved here. 
Fortunately, the FLN distinction is fairly clearly defined, though the same cannot be 
said of its content, leading to problems which corne into sharp focus when seen in the 
light of language evolution. 
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1.3. FLN and the saltationist argument 
1.3 .1 . The so-called "recursion-only" hypothesis 
The contents of FLN were defined in HCF, but unfortunately in such a way that it has 
led to much confusion and debate which could have been avoided. In the abstract of 
the article, HCF "hypothesize that FLN only includes recursion'', understandably 
leading Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) to characterize HCF's position as the 
"recursion-only hypothesis" (p.204). This was an unfortunate coining of the term as it 
tums out that there never was a "recursion-only hypothesis". Sorne years later, Fitch 
and Hauser both explicitly wrote that they "regret certain editorial decisions that 
perhaps made our argument more opaque than desirable" (Fitch, 2010 , p.75), and put 
forth a "mea culpa for unfortunate cutting of corners in the abstract of Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch (2002)" (Hauser, 2010, p.94). HCF apparently never meant 
anything like the "recursion-only hypothesis", and point out (Chomsky, persona! 
communication, Oct. 25th 2013) that they explicitly state in the article that "FLN 
comprises only the core computational mechanisms of recursion as they appear in 
narrow syntax and the mappings to the interfaces" (HCF 2002, p. 1573, emphasis 
mine). Recursion thus is meant to interface with the conceptual-intentional and 
sensory-motor systems in specific ways (and presumably any other system that may 
be contained in FLB). Those interfaces are thus included in FLN, and are meant to 
account for certain unique aspects of language. 
1.3.2. Critiques by Pinker and Jackendoff 
But, of course, what precisely "the mapping to the interfaces" means has also tumed 
out to be problematic. First, Jackendoff and Pinker, in their response to FHC 2005, 
raise the question as to whether the sentence is to be understood as the "mechanisms 
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of recursion as they appear in [ syntax and the mappmgs to the interfaces]" or 
" [mechanisms of recursion as they appear in syntax] and [the mappings to the 
interfaces]" (Jackendoff & Pinker, 2005, p. 217). In other words, it is not clear 
whether the sentence is meant to convey that it is recursion which is in both the 
narrow syntax and the interfaces which is to be considered FLN, or whether the 
recursion is only in the narrow syntax, and the mappings themselves are not 
(necessarily) recursive. Second, as Jackendoff and Pinker (2005 , p. 217) point out, it 
is unclear what the mappings to the interfaces are supposed to mean as it is never 
truly spelled out in either HCF or FHC. As we shall see later, Chomsky does provide 
more explicit explanations on this front in later articles (but as will also be shown, 
those explanations raise their own problems). 
Jackendoff and Pinker also made it clear that it was possible, as they did, to interpret 
the characteristics of FLN ( viz. being unique to language and unique to humans ), in a 
more gradua! way than HCF (and FHC). They propose that a given trait may be 
included in FLN if it has "been modified in the course of human evolution to such a 
degree that it is different in significant aspects from its evolutionary precursors[ ... ], 
though not necessarily different in every respect" (Jackendoff & Pinker, 2005 , p. 
214). Thus, although they adopt the FLB/FLN distinction, they place within FLN 
many other components of the language faculty, such as phonology, certain parts of 
concept formation, words, speech perception, etc. With respect to phonology for 
instance, Pinker and Jackendoff state: "It appears that some of the combinatorial 
properties of phonology have analogues in some species of birdsong, and perhaps in 
some cetacean song, but not in any primates; if so, they would have to have evolved 
separately in humans" (Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005 , p. 212). FHC for their part reject 
this approach in favour of a more strict delineation, all the while conceding that other 
researchers have defined FLN differently, "leaving the possibility of a more inclusive 
definition open to further empirical research" (HCF 2002, p.1571 ). 
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1.3.3. Language ' s appearance through saltation 
Such restrictions on admittance to FLN allow HCF to advance claims that it is not the 
result of adaptation but rather of a single random mutation. Whereas the contents of 
FLB may have "an ancient evolutionary history long predating the emergence of 
language", the hypothesis that FLN contains only recursion allows them to argue that 
"if FLN is indeed this restricted, this hypothesis has the interesting effect of 
nullifying the argument from design, and thus rendering the status of FLN as an 
adaptation open to question" (HCF 2002, p.1573). In other words, all prerequisites for 
language were already in place when recursion appeared, thus allowing the 
components of FLB to be exapted for language, implying that the faculty of language 
was not shaped as an adaptation for language. HCF leave the door open as to the 
origin of the sudden use of recursion in language, stating both that it "appears to lack 
any analog in animal communication and possibly other domains as well" (p. 
1571)-suggesting that it was a novelty in the biological world at the time of its 
appearance-and that it may be used "to solve other computational problems such as 
navigation, number quantification, or social relationships" (p. 1578) in humans or 
other species-suggesting that it may be an exaptation itself. The latter seems more 
plausible insofar as the capacities of navigation and social relationships certainly are 
present in other species, but it needs to be shown that they too rely on recursion. 
The saltationist argument also implies that language could not have evolved 
gradually, becoming more and more complex as adaptation ran its course, but rather 
appeared at a single moment in our species' history. This also precludes the 
possibility of a proto-language, on the premise that language is defined as the whole 
of FLB, including FLN. Thus, even if pre-linguistic communication could be shown 
to exist in hominids, the definition of language advanced by HCF is such that without 
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FLN, any talk of mechanisms related to communication cannot be referring to 
language. 
HCF therefore implicitly hold a saltationist approach to language evolution, as 
opposed to a gradualist one (as we shall see in chapter III, in subsequent publications 
Chomsky has made his saltationist approach more explicit) . As explained earlier, if 
no intermediate steps can be imagined between a trait' s absence and its apparition, 
then there is a good chance that it is the result of saltation. HCF claim that this is the 
case when stating that "we see little reason to believe either that FLN can be 
anatomized into many independent but interacting traits, each with its own 
independent evolutionary history, or that each of these traits could have been strongly 
shaped by natural selection" (p.1574) In contrast, if FLN contains only a single 
component, it is plausible to maintain that it appeared through one random mutation, 
especially if that component is thought to be very simple, yet able to account for the 
sudden appearance of a fully-formed language capacity. 
HCF unfortunately never define recursion, despite the fact that it plays such a central 
role in their theory, and according to them, in language itself. The closest they corne 
to defining it is by explaining that recursion "takes a finite set of elements and yields 
a potentially infini te array of discrete expressions" (HCF, p. 1571 ), without 
explaining how this is done. In the next section I will explore various definitions and 
show that the choice of definition has a strong impact on the claims in HCF. 
1.4. Recursion defined 
The ·notion of recursion is used in many disciplines, and its precise definition often 
differs depending on the context. Generally speaking, recursion is a process whereby 
an object, image, phenomenon, etc. calls upon or creates itself anew. A facile 
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illustration of this is to be found in an image which contains within itself the very 
same image, which itself contains the very same image, and so on. In computer 
science, a function or algorithm is recursive when the process calls upon itself in its 
own generation (Fitch, 2010). In linguistics, recursion has often been assumed to be 
central to language production, yet until recently, rarely rigorously and formally 
defined. As has been pointed out many times (cf. Parker 2006, Tallerman et al. 2009, 
Karlsson 2010, Fitch 2010), even linguistic recursion can be defined in many ways. 
The following are two distinct definitions which are both employed in linguistics. 
1.4.1. Recursion - definition 1: embedding 
A definition that was long used (often implicitly) in generative grammar is the 
following, sometimes referred to as "self-same embedding" and hereafter named 
"recursion-embedding": 
(iii) Recursion-embedding: the capacity for an algorithm to insert a structural 
unit of a particular type ( e.g. no un phrase, sentence) within another unit of the 
same type (Tallerman, et al. , 2009, p. 140). 
This is the type ofrecursion which was found in Chomsky's earlier writings, at least 
as early as Syntactic Structures (1957), where the explicit goal was "the construction 
of a grammar that can be viewed as a device of some sort for producing the 
sentences" (p. 11) of a given language. That "device" takes the form of a set of 
rewrite mies which constructs sentences from the top down. The following 
illustration is proposed by Bickerton (2009a, pp. 241-242): a given sentence S can be 
subdivided into a noun phrase (NP) and a verb phrase (VP). Thus we have the rule: 
(iv) S -+NP VP 
These phrases as well contain var1ous elements, such as determiners (Det), 
prepositional phrases (PP), as well as verbs (V) and nouns (N), yielding the following 
rules (items in brackets are optional): 
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(v) NP - (Det) N (PP) (S) 
(vi) VP - V (NP (NP) (PP) (S) 
(vii) PP - P NP 
These are recursive rules since S contains within it NP and VP, which each in turn 
contain S, implying that sentences can be inserted in sentences. A NP can also be 
contained within a NP through the PP rule. This type of recursion is found in 
sentences su ch as (the notation is simplified for ease of reading): 
(viii) [John thinks that [Mary loves Jake.] s]s 
(ix) [The <log on [the dock] NP]NP is noisy. 
This set of rules therefore allows the production of an infinite set of sentences 
through finite means, since the recursion ensures that rules can be repeated infinitely. 
1.4.2. Recursion - definition 2: cyclical 
A second way to define recursion bas become popular in the Minimalist Program in 
linguistics (cf. Nevins, Pesetsky, & Rodrigues 2009, Rizzi 2009). Researchers in the 
program posit that one of the central, if not the only, mechanism in language is 
'Merge', which joins two units into a single unit, and can potentially do so an infinite 
number of times, using its own output as input (Bickerton, 2009c ). According to this 
approach, recursion has the following broader definition, hereafter referred to as 
"recursion-cyclical": 
(x) Recursion-cyclical: "the property whereby certain formal rules or rule 
systems reapply to their own output" (Tallerman et al. , 2009, p. 140) 
Merge can join previously Merged units with other units, meaning that it can be 
applied to its own output indefinitely, and as such, is a recursive process. Note that 
Merge is not the only process that abides by recusion-cyclical: by definition, any 
process which can take its previous output as input is considered recursive. Unlike 
recursion-embedding, this type of recursion creates a bottom-up approach to sentence 
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construction since it begins with the basic lexical units and constructs sentences by 
adding additional units. Merge and this type of recursion will be discussed in detail in 
section 2, as it has corne to be central to Chomsky's views on language evolution. 
1.4.3. Effects of recursion 
Whether relying on definition 1 or 2, an important effect of recursion is that it is able 
to produce a boundless number of sentences using finite means. This point has been 
raised countless times by Chomsky ( eg. 1957, 1966, 2000a, 2005), as well as in HCF 
(p. 1571) and is seen as an essential feature of the faculty of language. Of course 
within anyone's finite lifetime it is impossible to produce or observe an infinity of 
sentences, and it must be inferred from available data and starting assumptions. By 
definition, both definitions of recursion are combinatorial processes which join 
discrete units (words or parts of sentences) into sentences which are boundless. 
However it needs to be noted that other types of algorithms, in particular iteration, 
can also create a boundless number of strings from finite means. An iterative 
algorithm is one which has the capacity to repeat its own process potentially 
. infinitely, just as a recursive one does. Indeed the distinction between these two types 
of algorithms can be difficult to grasp, since one might be tempted to think of one as 
a subclass of the other. However that is not the case, as each proceeds in different 
ways, yielding significant differences. 
The most significant difference is recursion's capacity for building a hierarchical 
structure within its constituents. Indeed it has long been recognized that sentences 
adhere to a hierarchical structure, thus accounting for the long-range dependencies 
between parts of sentences (e.g. subject-verb agreement, reflexives, etc.). A recursive 
algorithm builds this type of structure by including units within units, creating a 
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hierarchy. As Karlsson (2010) explains, an iterative algorithm, for its part, will not 
produce a hierarchical structure, yielding instead "flat output structures, repetitive 
sequences on the same depth level as the first instance." (p. 2) It follows, as Rizzi 
(2009) points out, that mere iteration of a process is not sufficient to claim it is 
recursive despite the fact that it too could produce a boundless nurnber of sentences 
using finite means. According to him, it is also "its capacity to create a hierarchical 
structure" (p.65) which is tell-tale of the recursive nature of a given algorithm. One 
important thing to remember however is that any structure created in language is only 
ever inferred, since extemalized language is always serialized and therefore 
transformed into a flat structure for output. This compounds the difficulty in 
differentiating between a recursive and an iterative algorithm since, as shall be 
explained in the next section, in most cases the serialized output of an iterative 
algorithm can be made to match that of a recursive one. 
1.5. Critiques to recursion-only 
In this section I will explain two critiques that have been levelled at the recursion-
only hypothesis, and show how they are not as potent as the authors expected them to 
be. The first is some corpus analysis done by Karlsson (2010), wherein he shows that 
the outputs of recursion-embedding are for the most part able to be reproduced 
through mere iteration. Furthermore, those examples which are unambiguously 
recursive-embedding are exceedingly rare, implying that recursion cannot be a central 
part of language. The second critique is Dan Everett's well-known and controversial 
claim that there exists a language, Pirahâ, which does not contain recursion. As we 
shall see, both these attempts to rebut the recursion-only hypothesis fail to do so, 
among other reasons because they attack a straw man in assuming that recursion can 
only be defined through embedding, as described in definition 1 above. As will be 
shown in chapters II and III, Chomsky explicitly adopts recursion-cyclical in his later 
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publications (Chomsky, 2010; Berwick & Chomsky 2011), rendering critiques to 
recursion-embedding obsolete (whether the choice of recursion-cyclical is superior is 
another matter: see Everett, 2009, p. 437-438 for a brief discussion regarding this 
issue). Nevertheless, at the time these critiques of HCF seemed important, still raise 
important points, and so are addressed here. 
1.5 .1. Karlsson: "True" recursion is rare 
Karlsson (2010) claims that the recursion-only hypothesis does not stand up to 
scrutiny because it simply is not manifest enough in spoken and written language. 
The first thing Karlsson notes is that much of recursion can be mimicked by iteration. 
lndeed, algorithms that specify sequential arrangement can corne in at least two 
forms: recursive and iterative. As mentioned earlier, whereas a recursive process will 
call upon its own output to yield a hierarchically structured output, "iteration yields 
flat output structures, repetitive sequences on the same depth level as the first 
instance." (Karlsson, 2010, p. 2) Yet the difference between the two is not obviously 
apparent in the output, since externalized language is always linear, and the depth of 
structure (should there be any) can only be inferred through analysis. In light of this, 
Karlsson claims that only very specific kinds of recursion-embedding are not 
convertible to iteration. Recursion-embedding cornes in two subtypes: nested 
recursion and tail-recursion. Tail-recursion adds components to the left or the right of 
a given structure; nested recursion ' splits open' the existing structure to add 
components in the middle. Sentence (viii) above is an example of tail recursion, 
repeated here for convenience: 
(xi) [John thinks that [Mary loves Jake.]s]s 
The following is an example of nested recursion: 
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(xii) [A lot of the housing [that the people [that worked in New Haven] lived in] 
was back that way.] (Reich and Dell 1976, quoted in Karlsson 2010, p.8) 
According to Karlsson, only nested recursion is not algorithmically convertible to 
iteration, and therefore "nested recursion ( center-embedding) is recursion par 
excellence" (Karlsson, 2010, p. 6). 
Karlsson then goes on to show through analyses of large corpus data of European 
languages that nested recursion is in fact quite rare, whether in written or spoken 
language. The maximum level of center-embedding for written language is 3, and for 
spoken 2, and appears so rarely in spoken language (twice in the hundreds of 
corpuses analysed) that Karlsson considers it "practically absent from ordinary 
spoken language" (p. 8). He then concludes that recursion "cannot therefore 
reasonably be considered a central design feature of language, as claimed by Hauser, 
Chomsky, and Fitch (2002)" (Karlsson, 2010, p. 8) since in the great majority of 
cases it is replaceable by iteration. 
1.5.2. Critique of Karlsson 
Two possible rebuttals from Chomsky corne to mind, which Karlsson effectively 
dodges. The first of those criticisms regards the relevance of corpus analysis to 
linguistics. Chomsky's criticism in this respect relies on the well-known 
competence/performance distinction he introduced early in his career. The distinction 
casts serious doubt on the relevance of research done on corpuses, since analyses of 
performance cannot be directly transferable to competence. However in the context of 
evolution this distinction does not apply directly: natural selection cares not a whit 
about competence, and selects only on the basis of performance. Research into 
performance is thus very relevant to language evolution. The second critique relates 
to Chomsky's emphasis on parsimony in explanations in linguistics (a desideratum 
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especially apparent within the Minimalist Program, as is seen in chapter II) : since 
there do exist cases of center-embedding which all typical speakers are capable of 
producing and understanding, and since recursion captures not only those cases which 
iteration can cover but also the cases of center-embedding (no matter how sparse they 
may be), it is more parsimonious to assume that the algorithm is only recursive, rather 
than assume that it is at times recursive, at times iterative. Once again, evolution does 
not care for the details regarding the mechanisms underlying performance, and does 
not in principle favour parsimony of competence.4 
Karlsson's critique rests on a very different paradigm for linguistics, which assumes 
that the structural principles proposed by Chomsky and others within the generative 
enterprise can all be translated to principles calling only on linear sequence. Since 
iteration yields only fiat output structures, accounting for all syntactic phenomena 
necessarily uses principles of basic linearization, free modification, and information-
packaging (Karlsson, 2010, pp. 1-2). This implies that the claim that iteration can 
replace recursion in practically ail cases rests on very different premises. The relative 
value of these paradigms is hotly debated by proponents of each, with no clear 
winner. The significance of Karlsson's critique thus rests on validation of his more 
general linguistic theory, which remains open to debate . 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the entire premise of the criticism rests upon the 
idea that linguistic recursion is only recursion-embedding. As will be shown in 
chapter II, Chomsky, at the very least, has espoused a view of language evolution that 
rests entirely on recursion-cyclical, meaning that Karlsson' s approach misses the 
mark if Chomsky' s theory was the aim. 
4 Of course, as Parker & Maynard Smith (1990) have argued, evolution does tend toward optimality, 
but it is optimality of performance that is in question, not competence. 
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1.5.3. Everett: Piraha 
In 2005, Dan Everett published an article in Current Anthropology wherein he 
claimed to have discovered a language with no recursion. The language is spoken by 
the Piraha, a small tribe in the Brazilian Amazonian jungle, which Everett visited for 
over 30 years, even living there with his family for years. His findings have led to a 
long and often acrimonious debate surrounding the validity of his claims, and its 
implications regarding language evolution. 
The Piraha language is a very complicated issue. When Everett' s (2005) article first 
came out, it seemed that he had perhaps found a drop-dead argument against HCF 
2002. The argument went as follows: if a language exists without recursion, then 
recursion cannot be the sole component of FLN, since if FLN has only a single 
component, it must necessarily be present in every language. Otherwise, since by 
definition FLN contains that which makes human language unique, there would be no 
difference between a non-recursive language and a non-human way of 
communicating. The claim the Everett had found such a language therefore caused a 
stir, and drew fire from some linguists. 
One salient critique that has been levelled at Everett is that his analysis of Piraha 
language is faulty. Nevins, Pesetsky and Rodrigues (2009) argue that the analysis 
done in Everett (2005) contradicts earlier analyses by Everett himself which show the 
presence of recursion-embedding in Piraha. They furthermore claim that most of the 
oddities pointed out by Everett regarding the language are "illusory, nonexistent, or 
not supported by adequate evidence" (Nevins, Pesetsky, & Rodrigues, 2009, p. 356). 
31 
Needless to say, Everett replied (20075, 2009), but since he is the only trained linguist 
to master the language, the field of linguistics is at pains to validate or deny his 
claims. 
1.5.4. The "official" answer and its pitfalls 
The "official" answer, found in HCF' s follow-up article, FHC 2005 , was that the 
existence of languages with no recursion is "irrelevant to the questions under 
discussion", since "the putative absence of obvious recursion in one of these 
languages is no more relevant to the human ability to master recursion than the 
existence of three-vowel languages calls into doubt the human ability to master a 
five- or ten-vowel language" (Fitch, Hauser, & Chomsky, 2005, p. 203). Evoking 
Jackendoffs (2002) analogy of language calling on a toolkit of cognitive resources, 
the authors argue that recursion is one tool among many that enables language 
acquisition, and that "not all languages use all the tools" (Fitch, Hauser, & Chomsky, 
2005, p. 204; see also Bickerton, 2009a, p. 239 for a similar response to Everett) . 
This answer is not satisfactory as-is, beginning with the toolkit analogy. Insofar as 
FLN contains only a single item, that item cannot be one optional tool among many, 
to be used or not depending on the language. As argued above, if recursion is the only 
component differentiating human language from other forms of communication, its 
absence in a particular human language implies that its inclusion in FLN is 
problematic. At the very least, it entails either that there must be more than one 
component in FLN (thus rehabilitating the toolkit analogy), or simply that recursion 
is not a component unique to language, in other words is part of FLB, not FLN. lt 
5 This predates the Nevins et al. (2009) publication as it was a response to the circulated, not yet 
published version. 
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may be necessary to point out here that this critique still holds if one remembers that 
the "mappings to the interfaces" need be included in FLN. The mappings themselves 
cannot provide the additional tools for the toolkit, since recursion is the sole 
component in FLN which can determine tho.se mappings. This therefore implies that 
recursion must still be present and operational for the mappings to be formed. Thus, if 
the toolkit analogy is to be employed, FLN must either contain more than one item, 
or the analogy applies to the various items in FLB. 
The second, implied answer is slightly more convincing, but not without its own 
problems. Implied is the fact that the absence of "obvious recursion" is not proof of 
absence of recursion in the cognitive process of language. Indeed, as mentioned 
before, once language is extemalized, all output is serialized and therefore all trace of 
recursion is only inferred. Thus, in order to show that a given language truly is 
without recursion, one would need to show that recursion is absent at all steps of the 
generative process. By Everett's own admission, the Pirahà people are able to think 
recursively: "I claim that the Pirahàs Jack recursion in the syntax. I made no such 
claim about their semantics or their discourse, for example. In fact, I have given many 
examples of recursion in discourse as different ideas are contained in others within 
the main and subordinate story lines." (Everett, 2007) Thus the important distinction 
is between linguistic capacities and general cognitive capacities. If recursion can be 
shown to simply be a part of general cognition and not tied specifically to language, 
then it cannot be in FLN, since by definition FLN con tains only components unique 
to language. However to advance such a claim, one would need to maintain 
simultaneously that ( 1) speakers of Pirahà think recursively only within the faculty of 
language and not general cognition (by definition of FLN), and (2) that their inability 
to express that recursivity through language tells us nothing about recursion in their 
language faculty. Such a position is difficult to imagine, and even more difficult to 
demonstrate empirically. 
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Soit would seem that, should Everett's analysis of Piraha be accurate, he does indeed 
have quite a strong bit of evidence against the recursion-only hypothesis. But, as 
should be clear from the discussion on recursion in the previous section, the weight of 
Everett' s claim depends on the definition of recursion he adopts. Everett claims more 
specifically that Piraha lacks recursion-embedding. Piraha are therefore purportedly 
unable to construct sentences such as "Mary thinks that John is ni ce", where a 
sentence is embedded in a sentence. Although this may be an interesting finding in 
and of itself, it has become apparent that of the three authors, Chomsky, at the very 
least, did not mean for recursion-embedding to be the kind of recursion found in FLN 
as his papers since then all focus on Merge and recursion-cyclical. As Nevins et al. 
(2009) point out, if recursion-cyclical is adopted, "a language that lacks recursion 
would be considerably more exotic. No sentence in such a language could contain 
more than two words" (footnote 11 , p.366). Needless to say, Piraha does produce 
sentences with more than two words, making it a facile argument that they do indeed 
use recursion-cyclical. Of course this may mean that recursion-cyclical is a type of 
recursion that is too broad to be restricted to FLN, an issue tackled in chapter II, 
section 2.6. 
But before developing Chomsky' s shift towards recursion-cyclical, let me first 
propose my own critique of the recursion-only hypothesis, which 1 believe to be 
superior to the two presented here since it neither relies on corpus data and all the 
problems that can bring about, nor on a single linguist's analysis of a language, nor 
even on a specific definition of recursion. 
1.6. Recursion as a property 
The most significant problem with the hypothesis advanced in HCF 2002 is that it is 
underspecified insofar as it does not put forward any specific mechanisms to account 
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for language competence. This becomes clear with a closer look at the role of 
recursion in the so-called "recursion-only hypothesis'', and the possible 
interpretations of their claims. 
The first thing to note is that "recursion" is not, properly said, an object in and of 
itself ("object" · here is meant to be theory-neutral and denote whichever term is 
deemed appropriate, be it algorithm, module or whatever type of process is expected 
to fulfill that role in language competence ). It is rather a property which an object 
may instantiate. As was described earlier, recursion, defined generally, can be 
instantiated by many things, including illustrations, formulas, algorithms or any 
generative process. The specific definitions found in linguistics as well can be 
instantiated by various algorithms, and no algorithm can have recursivity as its sole 
property since it must (at least) also specify input and output conditions. In other 
words, there is no such thing as a 'purely' recursive operation, or the recursive 
operation 
1.6.1. Recursion instantiated 
Considering the fact that recursion must be instantiated in an object, one can interpret 
the "recursion-only hypothesis" in one of two ways. Either (a) it claims that only the 
recursive aspect of a given algorithm is unique to language and to humans, or (b) it is 
simply a condensed way of saying that FLN contains only an algorithm which must 
be recursive. Neither of these approaches works, for different reasons. 
In order to defend (a), one would need to show that all properties of the algorithm, 
with the exception of recursion, are not unique to language and to humans (by 
definition of FLN). This would imply explaining how the very "same" algorithm, 
omitting the recursive aspect (in some strange way of interpreting "same") is part of 
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FLB. This seems conceptually impossible, as on the one hand a recursive algorithm 
without recursion can hardly be conceived of as the same algorithm since it would 
specify very different input-output combinations. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
conceive of what is left in FLN since the recursive property alone does not specify 
inputs and outputs of FLN, which are needed if we are to understand FLN as part of 
the generative process of the faculty of language. 
Certain passages in HCF hint that interpretation (b) seems to be closer to what HCF 
intended, but the object/property distinction is never truly addressed. The following 
passage suggests- albeit not entirely clearly- that they understood FLN as 
containing computational mechanisms which must be recursive (underlined sections 
will be addressed following the passage): 
Without prejudging the issues, we will, for concreteness, adopt a 
particular conception of this architecture [of the faculty of language]. 
We assume, putting aside the precise mechanisms, that a key 
component of FLN is a computational system (narrow syntax) that 
generates internai representations and maps them into the sensory-
motor interface by the phonological system, and into the conceptual-
intentional interface by the (formai) semantic system; adopting 
alternatives that have been proposed would not materially modify the 
ensuing discussion. All approaches agree that a core property of FLN 
is recursion, attributed to narrow syntax in the conception just 
outlined. (HCF 2002, p. 1573, emphasis mine) 
This passage is very difficult to parse because of its dissonance with other claims 
made elsewhere in the article. First, the proposed contents of FLN are now referred to 
as "key components of FLN," leaving open the idea that FLN may contain more than 
simply recursion or a recursive mechanism. Second, that key component is not 
recursion but an unspecified syntactic, generative process of internal representations. 
Third, recursion is here explicitly referred to as a "core property" not of the 
computational mechanism, but of FLN itself, implying that FLN itself is the object 
instantiating the property of recursion, rather than being a conceptual distinction 
between parts of the language faculty. To be fair, in this case the authors may have 
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meant FLN to refer to the mechanisms themselves rather than the distinction. These 
three points lead to believe that the "recursion-only hypothesis" meant for FLN to 
contain not recursion alone, but a mechanism which must be recursive. But this does 
not circumvent the most significant problem: what mechanisms are we talking about 
specifically? 
1.6.2. The recursive property and the interfaces 
HCF apparently assume that they can put aside the question of the precise mechanism 
since "all approaches agree that a core property of FLN is recursion", but it 
nevertheless leaves their hypothesis peculiarly unspecific. Needless to say, 
determining which recursive mechanisms instantiate recursion will inform much of 
the discussions surrounding linguistic competence, the cognitive architecture 
involved in language, the "interfaces to the systems", and even language evolution 
itself. Taking for instance the "interface to the systems" which HCF include in FLN, 
it is clear that those interactions between the sensory-motor system and the syntactic 
system will be determined in no small measure by the specific inputs and outputs of 
the algorithm which accounts for syntactic competence. In other words, since 
recursion is a property and not an algorithm or mechanism in and of itself, it is 
incoherent to assume that only that property and its interfaces would comprise FLN, 
since whatever algorithm or mechanism that is instantiating the recursion must also 
be in FLN, and it is that algorithm which would determine the interfaces to other 
systems, rather than merely its recursive property. 
It is possible that HCF deliberately proposed a weak hypothesis in order to be 
inclusive of the most linguistic theories possible. FHC, their second article, does 
seem to support this interpretation: "To be precise, we suggest that a significant piece 
of the linguistic machinery entails recursive operations" (p.182); and later: "The only 
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assumption made in HCF, and here, about syntactic theory is the uncontroversial one 
that, minimally, it should have a place for recursion." (p.183) But if the "recursion-
only hypothesis" in fact meant that FLN must contain algorithms which minimally 
have recursion as a property, then the hypothesis is so weak as to do little to advance 
research since HCF themselves point out that "all approaches agree" with this claim 
already (though not everyone agrees with this claim). By diluting the hypothesis to 
this extent, it leaves it open as to which mechanism plays the key role of FLN since 
linguists have already proposed various recursive mechanisms to account for 
language production and comprehension. Consequently, the hypothesis in HCF does 
little to restrict research into language evolution any further than it already was, 
except to assume that some as-yet-unspecified syntactic component is unique to 
humans and to language. This, incidentally, is just what Chomsky' s hypothesis of 
Universal Grammar has always been. If the principal aim of the hypothesis was to aid 
in circumscribing the precise mechanisms which should be at the heart of 
investigations into language evolution, then the article has missed its mark. 
1.7. Conclusion 
In sum, HCF 's article featured Chomsky's explicit entrance into the language 
evolution debate, but suffered from many problems which could have been avoided 
with careful attention to the concepts deployed. FLN and FLB could potentially serve 
as useful tools for communication across disciplines, but would need to be more 
rigorously defined to avoid inclusion or exclusion of unwarranted mechanisms. The 
content of FLN is the most contentious and problematic aspect of HCF, with claims 
regarding the status of recursion that at times seem contradictory, as well as a lacking 
but necessary definition of recursion. This left them open to many critiques which 
unfortunately ended up attacking a straw man once recursion and the "recursion-only 
hypothesis" were better clarified. Finally, once it is recognized that recursion is a 
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property, it becomes clear that recursion cannot be the sole component of FLN since 
it must be instantiated. At best, HCF merely meant that FLN must contain a recursive 
algorithm, in which case it is merely a rehashing of Chomsky' s argument for 
Universal Grammar. 
The next chapter explains Chomsky's current favoured approach to linguistics, the 
Minimalist Program, including the mechanisms advanced to account for the language 
faculty . These specific mechanisms, as well as the notions advanced in HCF 
regarding the FLN/FLB distinction and the emphasis on recursion, lay the 
foundations for Chomsky's more recent approach to language evolution as explained 
in chapter III. 
CHAPTERII 
THE MINIMALIST PROGRAM 
2.1. Beyond the "recursion-only" hypothesis 
Following the publications co-authored with Hauser and Fitch (Hauser et. al., 2002; 
Fitch et. al. 2005), Chomsky published articles which . advanced slightly different 
proposais regarding the evolution of language, most explicitly in Chomsky (2010) 
and Berwick & Chomsky (2011). These articles take as foundation the work done 
within the Minimalist Program (henceforth MP), the latest paradigm adopted by 
Chomsky for linguistic investigations. Since the MP advances specific mechanisms to 
account for the workings of the language faculty, the articles concerning language 
evolution do so as well, answering the main criticism levelled at HCF (2002) in 
chapter I. HCF (2002) proposed that FLN be comprised of only recursion and the 
interfaces to the CI and SM systems, a proposition I argued was incomplete once it is 
recognized that recursion is a property which must be instantiated in an algorithm, 
implying that the algorithm in question as well must be included in FLN. By adopting 
the specific algorithms and properties put forward by the MP, Chomsky (2010) and 
Berwick & Chomsky (2011) resolve the problem, but as shall be seen in chapter III, 
open themselves to additional important critiques. 
In order to understand the proposais advanced in Chomsky's later writings regarding 
language evolution, a cursory knowledge of the MP is necessary. This chapter is 
therefore a general exposition of the main mechanisms proposed within the MP to 
account for the workings of the language faculty. I begin with a very brief mention of 
40 
the history and aims of the MP in section 2.2, followed in section 2.3 by a description 
of the basic mechanisms proposed within the MP framework, namely Merge and the 
lexical items. Section 2.4 puts the mechanisms to work, showing how a syntactic 
derivation is performed, and the complexities that arise. In section 2.5, I investigate 
the place of Merge within the faculty of language, arguing that Merge' s simplicity 
depends on offloading computational complexity-and even recursion itself to some 
extent--onto lexical features. Finally, section 2.6 investigates the possible broader 
application of Merge in human cognition and non-human capacities. 
2.2. The Minimalist Program as field of research 
2.2.1. Brief history 
Chomsky has often changed his linguistic theories over the years, building upon new 
ideas and often leaving behind former students or colleagues beleaguered in a 
paradigm he now considers obsolete. His most recent such shift has been with the 
development of the MP, first proposed in an article in 1993, re-published along with 
other articles in Chomsky's book The Minimalist Program (1995). In a nutshell, the 
MP tries to reduce the linguistic mechanisms proposed, and thus the complexity of 
the language faculty, to a minimum. 
The MP is said to have grown out of the "Principles and Parameters" (P&P) 
approach, which posited that language acquisition is regulated by broad principles 
which are 'activated' or not by certain parameters. Chomsky explains the theory 
through a switch metaphor: 
We may think of the language faculty as a complex and intricate network 
of some sort associated with a switch box consisting of an array of 
switches that can be in one of two positions. [ .. .]. The fixed network is 
the system of principles of universal grammar; the switches are the 
parameters to be fixed by experience. (Chomsky, 1988, pp. 62-63) 
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Exposure to the language of the surrounding community makes the individual' s 
language faculty switch the various parameters, permitting acquisition of any and all 
languages of the world. Berwick (2011) explains that "akin to atomic theory, this 
small set of constraints may be recombined in different ways to yield the distinctive 
syntactic properties of diverse natural languages, just as a handful of elements 
recombine to yield the many different molecular types" (p. 82) The P&P approach 
assurned that the syntax-building algorithrns were many, and interacted in various 
ways to yield all the possible hurnan languages. In this view the faculty of language 
remained a complex phenomenon with a heavy computational load on the syntactic 
algorithrns, a notion the MP set out to disprove. 
The MP grew out of the P&P approach, but the reason why is debated. For Holmberg 
(2000) the MP stems from certain empirical problems encountered in the P&P 
approach, licencing the paradigm shift. For others (Boeckx, 2006) the MP is the result 
of the successes of the P&P, with a new emphasis on optimality: "solv.ing the 
acquisition problem was the paramount measure of theoretical success in linguistics 
[for the P&P approach]. Once, however, this problem is taken as essentially 
understood, then the question is not how to solve it but how to solve it best." 
(Boeckx, 2006, p. 61) For others still (Lappin, Levine, & Johnson, 2000), the MP 
rests not on empirical findings and difficulties stemming from the P&P approach, but 
rather on obscure appeals to efficiency and optimality, driven mostly by Chomsky' s 
speculations and his strong influence in the field. Whatever its origins, the MP 
represents a shift away from the complexity found in the P&P approach to a more 
parsimonious view of the faculty of language. 
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2.2.2. Aims 
The MP' s general purpose is said to be the reduction of the number of mechanisms 
needed to account for language. According to Chomsky (2010) the MP "is largely 
theory neutral" and applicable "whatever one' s beliefs about design of language may 
be" (p. 51 ). Of course this statement is debatable, as the MP is far from unanimously 
adopted in linguistics, as demonstrated by the many publications criticizing the 
program or proposing alternative paradigms. As is shown in section 2.3 , the MP does 
not limit itself to broad ideals of parsimony, but also proposes more or less concrete 
and precise mechanisms to account for the language faculty. 
The MP is deliberately presented as a program and not a theory to emphasize the fact 
that it is meant as a general line of inquiry to be pursued, and is furthermore 
ostensibly theory-neutral. Evoking Imre Lakatos ' notion of "research programme" in 
philosophy of science (Boeckx, 2006, pp. 6-7), the MP proposes a core idea which 
remains even if the more superficial auxiliary hypotheses could eventually be 
disproved. Di Scullio and Boeckx (2011) characterize that core as a "challenge to the 
linguistic community: Can it be shown that the computational system at the core of 
the language faculty is optimally or perfectly designed to meet the demands on the 
systems of the mind/brain it interacts with?" (pp. 3-4) The systems of the mind in 
question are those found in HCF (2002): the Conceptual-Intentional (CI) and 
Sensorimotor (SM) systems. The components of the language faculty thus must link 
in the most direct way possible the two systems, "containing a minimum of specific 
grammatical machinery" (Benitez-Burraco & Longa, 2010, p. 315) . Boeckx (2006) 
describes the idea of a 'perfect' design for the language faculty as the strongest 
hypothesis, "probably too strong", which "acts as a limiting case, enabling us to see 
more precisely where and when the hypothesis fails and how much of it may be true." 
(Boeckx, 2006, p. 4) Researchers thus attempt to resolve the problems raised by 
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linguistic phenomena using as few stipulations and mechanisms possible, in the hopes 
of demonstrating that the assumption of a "perfect" language faculty is warranted. 
The stated purpose of the emphasis on efficiency and parsimony within the MP is a 
belief that it will lead to reconciliation with the biological sciences. This approach, 
altemately dubbed 'biolinguistics', "forces linguists to reformulate previous findings 
in terms of elementary units, operations, and interface conditions" (Di Scullio & 
Boeckx, 2011 , p. 4), concepts which it is believed will be found in other biological 
domains. These parallels with other fields could then be used to "contribute to our 
understanding of how core properties of language are implemented in neural tissues 
and how it [sic] evolved in the species.". (Boeckx, 2011 , p. 43) By reducing 
mechanisms to a minimum and appealing to broad computational principles, 
researchers in the MP hope to end "linguistic isolationism" (Di Scullio & Boeckx, 
2011 , p. 4) and show that linguistic mechanisms are amenable to biological and 
neurological investigation through discoveries of parallels or correlates. 
This explicit aim raises some questions regarding the plausibility of such a research 
program insofar as the mechanisms that stem from biological evolution need not-
and perhaps even tend not-to be parsimonious in their operation. Although 
adaptations can tend towards optimality, that optimality is geared towards fitness 
(Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990), and not the inner mechanisms; because the 
mechanisms are more often than not the result of the tinkering of evolution, they may 
end up being less than elegant, yet nevertheless appropriately functional for the 
purposes of fitness. Thus the biolinguistics approach as it is stated above is 
potentially problematic and may not mesh properly with evolutionary biology (see 
Kinsella & Marcus 2009 for more detailed arguments, and Narita & Fujita 2010 for a 
response). These questions are all the more relevant since, as will be shown in chapter 
III, the search for minimalism plays a central role in the saltationist justification. 
However the aim of this paper is to critique the saltationist position, taking for 
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granted the theoretical framework built by Chomsky and his collaborators, and as 
such, these interesting questions will be set aside for the time being. 
2.3. Building blocks of the MP 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the fact that the MP is supposed to be a program 
and not a theory, linguists within the program adopt a set of assumptions regarding 
basic elements of the language faculty. Theories proposed may vary with respect to 
details, but all seem to agree that there exist at least two elements needed to account 
for the language faculty: Merge and lexical units (Clark, 2013, p. 188). Both are 
briefly described below in sections 2.3.l and 2.3.2, with their full role and interaction 
shown in section 2.3.3. 
2.3.1. Merge 
Merge is the basic combinatorial algorithm within the MP, and is expected to account 
for all syntactic manipulations. lt is put forward as "the basic structure building 
operation of syntax" (Collins & Stabler, 2011 , p. 5) or "the basic syntax-creating 
process" (Bickerton 2009b, p. 4). Merge combines two lexical units to create a single 
lexical unit containing the two original units. It can be described as "an operation that 
takes structures X and Y already formed and combines them into a new structure Z 
[ ... ] we can take Z to be simply {X,Y} " (Chomsky, 2010, p. 52) . The units thus 
"Merged" (when capitalized, I refer specifically to the action performed by Merge, or 
result thereof) remain intact, and the new lexical unit is merely the set of the two 
original units . 
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Merge can be further subdivided into (at least) two distinct types of Merge: External 
and Internai Merge. Externat Merge is the straightforward type described above, 
where two lexical units are combined into a set. For instance, in the case where 
Merge applies to the (previously Merged) set {A, B} and the unit C, the result of such 
an External Merge is { C, {A, B}}. A more concrete example is the External Merge of 
{eat, that} with {you} , yielding the phrase {you, {eat, that} }. Interna! Merge is used 
in a case where one of the units to be Merged is a subset of the other item to be 
Merged (Chomsky, 2010, p. 54). For example, if Merge is applied to the (previously 
Merged) set {A, B} , and one of the units within it, say B, the necessary operation is 
Interna! Merge, with the resulting set: {B, {A, B}}. This latter type of Merge is often 
used in question formation, as in the case of Merging { will} with {you, will}, 
yielding { will, {you, will}, where "will" is not only a second application of the word 
"will", but actually the same token of the word. At a later stage, before being 
extemalized, the first "will" is suppressed, yielding the question "will you?"6 The 
difference between the two types ofMerge is the origin of the items to be Merged: for 
External Merge, both items are independent of one another ( either drawn from the 
lexicon or taken from previous applications of Merge ), whereas for Internai Merge 
one item is already contained within the other. The use of both types of Merge is 
explained in greater detail in section 2.4, with additional examples. According to 
Rizzi (2009), the two types of Merge should not be seen as distinct operations: "What 
differs in the two cases is simply the way in which the two candidates of Merge [B or 
C], are selected through search in the available computational space" (p.80). Thus 
6 Sorne explanation may be needed for those less familiar with generative grammar: "will" is assumed 
to follow "you" since it is interpreted as the verb of the subject "you", but it is also thought to also 
precede "you" since that is how it is expressed once externalized. lt was previously thought that the 
word "will" moved to the beginning of the sentence at some point in the derivation, but it is now 
thought to be present at bath positions, and only later suppressed at the original position. Internai 
Merge is th us meant to account for phenomena previously accounted for through "move" in earlier 
theories of generative grammar. 
46 
Merge, despite these two ways of applying it, is nevertheless thought to be a single 
operation. 
As described in chapter I, Merge is therefore recursive-cyclical: it can apply to its 
own output. Indeed it can call upon any lexical unit to combine with another, but also 
those lexical units which were created by previous applications of Merge. There is 
hence no limit to iterations of Merge, yielding, as sought, a language which is "a 
system of discrete infinity" (Chomsky, 2005, p. 11). As is desirable within the MP, 
Merge is expected to be "the simplest mode of recursive generation" (Berwick & 
Chomsky, 2011 , p. 30), or "the ultimate distilled format of syntactic recursion" 
(Rizzi, 2009, p. 67), satisfying the requirement for a recursive mechanism, all the 
while remaining as elementary as possible. 
2.3.2. Lexical items 
For Merge to be applied as an algorithm, it needs of course an input, in the form of 
"atoms of computation" (Chomsky, 2010, p. 57): the lexical units. These units can be 
anything from words to affixes, from a phrase to a clause (Bickerton 2009b, p. 4; 
Berwick 2011 , p. 87). All non-combined lexical units are stored in an inventory 
called the lexicon, from which Merge retrieves units to build sentences. 
In Chomsky' s writings these lexical units are often conflated with concepts, although 
the equivalence is never made explicit, and the possibility that they may be different 
is acknowledged. Lexical units are alternately called "lexical items/concepts", 
"conceptual atoms of thought" (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 39), or "interna! 
conceptual symbols" (Chomsky, 2010, p. 57), suggesting an equivalence between 
lexical items and concepts. Other passages however suggest that there may be a 
difference since they are evoked independently: "words and concepts of human 
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language" (Chomsky 2010, p. 57; Berwick & Chomsky 2011, p. 39). Ultimately, 
Chomsky is silent on the relation between words and concepts, stating only that "the 
extent that they differ [ ... ] is far from a simple question" (Chomsky, 2010, p. 57). Of 
course much work has been done on this question (see Meunier, 2006 for an 
overview of the philosophical tradition; Machery, 2009 for an overview and critique 
of the cognitive science approach), which unfortunately Chomsky does not mention. 
One aspect of these lexical items Chomsky is clear about is their non-referentialist 
property. Chomsky has argued in many instances (Chomsky 2000a; 2005; 2010; 
Berwick & Chomsky 2011) that "even the simplest words and concepts of human 
language and thought lack the relation to mind-independent entities that appears to be 
characteristic of animal communication." (Chomsky, 2010, p. 57) He recognizes that 
this is contra "Frege, Peirce, Tarski, Quine, and contemporary "extemalist" 
philosophy of language and mind", but nevertheless maintains that non-referentialism 
is one of the "critical differences between human conceptual systems and symbolic/ 
representational systems of other animais," (ibid. , p. 57) and must be accounted for in 
language evolution. 
Lexical items furthermore have lexical features which licence the Merge with other 
lexical items. In fact, lexical items are sometimes construed as no more than "a list of 
features" (Berwick, 2011 , p. 84; see also Collins & Stabler, 2011 , p. 2), which will 
internet in the generative procedure (also called a derivation), in a process called 
feature checking. Individual lexical items will thus have features such as +/or -f, 
which can cancel each other, erasing the features in the course of the derivation. 
Other features can be represented as = x, which select a certain category of feature 
(Berwick, 2011, p. 87). Features can be semantic, syntactic or phonetic (Collins & 
Stabler, 2011 , p. 2), with each playing differing roles in the derivation or at the 
interfaces of the CI and SM systems. How lexical items, lexical features and Merge 
internet is illustrated in the following section. 
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2.4. Application of Merge and lexical features 
The building blacks of the language faculty proposed within the MP interact in 
specific ways in an attempt to account for the formation of all and only grammatical 
sentences. Berwick (2011) illustrates a derivation as follows, seen in context in figure 
1: "For example, we take the to be a determiner, + det, selecting the feature n(oun), 
*•e 3; [ y1 + c T 1 -+ 
lheidec..•n JUY. +n -eue 
~·A . 1. ~7°"' 
me guy .drank , , . 
FIGURE 1 - (taken from Berwick, 2011 , p. 86) Example of a derivation through four 
applications of Merge. Merge applies either to words from the lexicon or previously merged 
lexical units. Features get checked through each Merge, until ail features have been 
eliminated, with the result sent to the "motor articulation" (i.e. the SM system) or the CI 
system. 
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so it has the formai features + det, = n; while wine is marked + n, - Case.7 The = n 
feature can select the + n feature, so Merge can apply in this case." (Berwick, 2011, 
p. 87) In this example only syntactic features are shown. Features thus get "checked" 
as they are paired with the appropriate corresponding feature in a Merge operation. 
Whatever features cannot be checked in that application of Merge remain in the new 
lexical item, triggering further applications of Merge. The derivation continues until 
all features have been checked. 
2.4.1. Asymmetry of interfaces 
Once feature-checking is complete, the phrase structure is sent through the interfaces 
to the SM and CI systems. At this point the output is structured as the binary 
branching seen at the bottom of figure 1. At the interface to the SM system, it is 
serialized, placing one word after the other to allow for 'extemalization' through 
speech or sign. It is suggested that linearization may be restricted to the SM system, 
with "no order [ ... ] introduced in the rest of the syntactic computation" (Chomsky, 
2005, p. 15). In other words, rather than linearizing the output, the CI system 
interprets the phrase as a branching tree, in all its hierarchical structural complexity, 
and attributes meaning. In a simple case such as figure 1 this seems trivial, but as is 
shown in the next paragraph, in cases where the structure is more complex or 
undergoes more radical transformations at the SM interface, the difference can be 
significant. This difference in the two interfaces has been called the ' asymmetry of 
interfaces ', a purported fact which is thought to be related to language evolution, as 
will be shown in chapter III. 
7 
"Case" is a grammatical category which reflects the roles of nouns and pronouns within a sentence. 
Variations in case account for the difference between subject and object, which in turn accounts for 
(among other things) the difference between '!'and 'me'. Sorne languages a cross the world use case 
on other categories of words, and have multiple different cases. 
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How this asymmetry is significant becomes apparent in examples of the use of 
Intemal Merge. Internal Merge is used in cases that were previously explained 
through the use of "Move", a syntactic operation which was thought to be necessary 
to explain the formation of wh-questions . Consider for instance the interrogative 
What will you say? The derivation of this sentence (shown below) calls on 
applications of External and Internal Merge, as well as the lexical item with only the 
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feature Q, "for "question," that attracts what, while what possesses a - Q feature" 
(Berwick, 2011, p. 89). As a word is recruited through Internai Merge, it occupies 
both its original position as well as the new position at the head of the phrase. The 
deletions, here represented as a strikethrough, are not thought to happen during the 
derivation itself but for communication. The following derivation is adapted from 
Rizzi (2009, p. 80): 
(xiii) Derivation 
Lexical items 
(a) {say what} 
(b) {you {say what}} 
(c) {will {you {say what}}} 
(d) {you {will {yoo {say what}}}} 
(e) {Q {you {will {yoo {say what}}}}} · 
(f) {will+Q {you {will {yoo {say what}}}}} 
(g) {what {will+Q {you {will {yoo {say wfiat}}}}}} 
Type ofMerge 
Ext Merge 
Ext Merge 
Ext Merge 
Int Merge 
Ext Merge 
Int Merge 
Int Merge 
The deletions marked by a strikethrough are thought to happen only at the SM 
interface, where duplicates are removed in order to reduce computational load. 
Berwick & Chomsky (2011) note that "serial motor activity is computationally 
costly", and that "with all but one of the occurrences of [ duplicates] suppressed, the 
computational burden is greatly eased. The one occurrence that must be pronounced 
is the most prominent one, the last one created by Internal Merge." (pp. 31-32) 
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Deleting duplicate words before extemalization alleviates the computational load, but 
it does so at the expense of ease of interpretation. At the CI interface on the other 
hand, there is no serial motor activity involved, therefore there is no need for 
deletion: "the full internai expression is interpreted at the semantic [i.e. CI] interface" 
(Chomsky 2010, p. 54) Thus the CI system analyses the full structure with no lexical 
items suppressed. Consequently, suppressions are undone during parsing 
(interpretation) of communication, and the structure of the sentence is reconstructed 
for interpretation at the CI system (for a more complete understanding of the parsing 
operations, see Berwick, 2011, pp. 95-98). 
2.4.2. Additional complexities in syntax 
These two elements, Merge and lexical items/features, as well as the interfaces to the 
systems, are expected to account for all syntactic constructions in every language 
across the world. This includes more difficult syntactic phenomena two examples of 
which are Binding and Control (Bickerton, 2009b, p.8; the following summary and 
illustrations are taken from this article). Binding is the relationship between anaphors 
(himself, her, etc.) and the subjects to which they refer. Control is a way to describe 
the subject of certain verbs in subordinate clauses. Compare the following sentences: 
(xiv) Mary told Bill to leave immediately. 
(xv) Bill promised Mary to leave immediately. 
The subject of "leave" is understood as being Bill in both cases, despite their 
inversion in the first clause, a fact which must be accounted for in any linguistic 
explanation. Linguists are very familiar with these issues as well as many others, as 
they are often the benchrnark on which a theory can be tested (see Bickerton 2009b 
for a more in-depth description of this phenomena, as well as Tallerman et al., 2009 
for additional syntactic peculiarities to account for in any syntactic theory). 
Researchers within the MP are currently working to explain all these phenomena with 
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only Merge and lexical features, with some measure of success. As should now be 
clear, the gamble (as Boeckx, 2006 calls it) that the MP will be able to do so is far 
from won, with specific mechanisms and details of features and derivations still being 
debated. 
lt may well be that additional mechanisms are needed to account for ail syntactic 
phenomena. At least three of those mechanisms may in fact already be implied in the 
interactions between Merge and the lexical features . The first is the "checking" of 
lexical features which seems to be stemming not from Merge, but from the features 
themselves. Just as the pieces of a puzzle fit together to eliminate odd-shaped ends, it 
could be argued that feature-checking cornes ' for free ' from the features themselves. 
The second mechanism that may or may not already be accounted for is how the 
features which are not checked are 'projected' to the Merged set, licencing further 
applications of Merge. This, again, does not seem to be a property attributable to 
Merge, but could perhaps be another property of the features. Chomsky (2008, 2013) 
has evoked a "labeling algorithrn" ( quoted in Collins, 2014) to account for the 
ascription of features to the Merged sets. The third is the relations between lexical 
units, and how those relations are a consequence of their relative position in the tree-
structure. The fact that such relations exist is clear from the phenomena explained in 
the previous paragraph, such as control. According to Berwick (2011 ), su ch relations 
are explainable through the "temporal sequence of Merge," or "derivational history" 
(p. 92), with no additional mechanism stipulated. Whether it is indeed the case that 
the sequence of Merges can explain all structural dependencies or not is an open 
question (Bickerton, 2009b). Of course, with the MP focusing on optimality, attempts 
are underway to reduce these-and indeed all- interactions to merely properties of 
Merge or of the features, without resorting to additional stipulations (see e.g. Collins, 
2014). 
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2.5. The place of Merge in the faculty oflanguage 
According to the MP, Merge plays a central role in all syntactic processing, an idea 
which, as will be shown in chapter III, becomes a driving force behind Chomsky' s 
account of the evolution of language. In anticipation of the arguments, this section 
evaluates just how important Merge is to the language faculty. 
2.5.1. Computational load 
Contrary to the P&P approach, the MP offloads the computational complexities of 
syntactic phenomena onto the lexical features. Whereas the P&P theories assumed 
that the syntactic algorithms were many and interacted in complex ways, the MP has 
reduced the algorithm to the utmost, to posit only Merge. However the cost of such 
apparent simplicity was to offload the computational complexity onto the lexical 
features. It is they which account for limitations in the production of sentences, 
distinguishing grammatical from ungrammatical sentences. lndeed without features, 
Merge alone does not yield well-formed sentences, having no constraints on 
applications of the combinatorial algorithm. Moreover, the features may even drive 
the entire syntactic process, as argued in the next sub-section. 
2.5.2. Merge and recursion 
For those familiar with previous versions of the generative grarnmar enterprise, it is 
interesting to note the MP uses a bottom-up approach to sentence-construction, rather 
than the previous top-down approach, with implications for recursion. In previous 
models, such as the one schematized in chapter I (section 1.4.1; recursion - definition 
1: embedding), the sentence structure was built first using recursion-embedding, with 
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rewrite rules of the type "S - NP VP", then populated with lexical units. In the MP, 
lexical units are the building blocks, with the structure appearing only through 
successive applications of Merge. As noted earlier, this approach shifts the type of 
recursion from embedding to cyclical. Y et recall that one of the essential features 
differentiating recursion from iteration is the hierarchical structure which emerges-a 
structure which may not be possible without lexical features . 
Indeed Merge is not entirely responsible for the structure-building insofar as it is 
triggered by the lexical features, since it is they that necessitate further applications of 
the algorithm to complete the feature-checking . Collins & Stabler (2011 , pp. 17-18) 
illustrate through various quotations from researchers in the MP that lexical features 
are understood to drive the applications of Merge; Berwick (2011) expresses this idea 
succinctly: "All structure-building is feature-driven" (p. 88). In other words, the 
successive applications of Merge are possible and necessary only insofar as the 
feature checking is incomplete. Bickerton (2009b) has noticed the same issue: "it is 
not simply Merge, but rather Merge + lexical material that constitute the recursive 
process, as well as force it to result in a hierarchical structure." (p. 7, footnote 2) lt is 
thus incomplete to affirm that Merge accounts for recursion in the language faculty, 
as it depends on lexical items and their features as well for its recursive generative 
process. 
2.6. The broader scope of Merge 
In light of the significant role of lexical features regarding important properties of the 
language faculty such as identification of grammatical sentences, as well as recursion 
itself, the question arises whether Merge on its own, now recognized essentially as a 
simple combinatorial algorithm, could be used in other cognitive processes. As will 
be shown in chapter III, Chomsky places Merge within FLN, hence believing that it is 
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a uniquely human and uniquely linguistic phenomenon. If it could be shown that it is 
found in other human cognitive capabilities, or even in other species, this would call 
into question its place within FLN. 
2.6.1. In human cognition 
Although not calling upon Merge itself, Corballis (2011) argues that recursion is not 
restricted to language processing, but also involved in other capabilities unique to 
humans. According to Corballis, the ability to project our plans into the future and 
reflect upon our memories "is recursive, in that one can insert previous personal 
experience [or future imagined experience] into present awareness," (Corballis, 2011 , 
p. 85) in what he dubs "mental time travel" (ibid., p. 81 ). It is also the foundation for 
our theory of mind, which "is recursive, in the sense that it involves the insertion of 
· what you believe to be someone else ' s state of mind into your own." (ibid., p. 133) 
For Corballis then, recursion "is the primary characteristic that distinguishes the 
human mind from that of other animais." (ibid., 2011 , p. 1) 
Could these processes be accounted for through applications of Merge? Insofar as 
applications of Merge are driven by feature-checking, which is what creates the 
hierarchical structure, the answer is clearly no. However there are similarities to the 
extent that mental time travel and theory of mind rely on recursion, and could 
conceivably be the result of a Merge-like operation which does not rely on features 
but rather on some other concept-matching properties. Interestingly, this is not 
problematic for Chomsky since, as will be explained in chapter Ill, he believes that 
the power of Merge and the language faculty apply to cognition more generally, 
enabling "thought and planning" (Chomsky, 2010, p. 55), and presumably the 
processes described by Corballis. However for Chomsky these capacities are 
dependent upon the language faculty, presumably obviating the need for the 
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postulation of either a non-linguistic Merge or non-linguistic features. The capacities 
would thus have appeared in conjunction with the language faculty. This is at the very 
least a debatable claim, which could be challenged by finding recursive cognitive 
processes in non-human animais. 
2.6.2.. In non-human cognition 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch have already mentioned that recursion could play a role 
in certain areas of animal cognition such as navigation or social relations (HCF 2002, 
p.1578), but it was unclear what type of recursion was in question. Regarding 
Chomsky' s more recent work, if Merge or a Merge-like operation does indeed play a 
broader role in human cognition, it would be reasonable to suppose that it is present 
in other species, implying that its origin may be traced back to a common ancestor 
between humans and those species. Bickerton (2009b) argues that if Merge is defined 
simply as a combinatorial algorithm which can apply to its own output (i .e. omitting 
the role played by features) , then it is surely pervasive across species. The point is 
illustrated with the following example (Bickerton, 2009b, p. 6): "a bird building a 
nest, for example: 
Step 1: Weave two twigs together. 
Step 2: Interweave a third twig with the interwoven pair. 
Step 3: Interweave a fourth twig with the interwoven three, etc." 
Notice that this process can certainly be captured by Merge since the input of each 
step (except the first, of course) is the output of the previous. Thus if Merge truly is 
only such a simple algorithm, then it is surely widespread among ail species who are 
able to act according to the result of their previous action. 
One might argue however that the process of nest-building described above does not 
quite mirror the full . power of Merge as it is used in linguistic processing. As 
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explained earlier, Merge operates on linguistic items repetitively until all features are 
checked, after which the output is shipped to the sensory-motor systems, which 
extemalizes it. The process is therefore more complex than merely the ability to act 
upon one's previous output since it involves keeping in memory, or ' stacking' 
information that is created along the way and creating an internai structure where the 
dependencies are not simply the effect of linear order. In other words, once the phrase 
is externalized, the words produced will not always be dependent merely on the 
previous words uttered; the first word can be dependent upon later words, implying 
that there is a structural complexity not captured in the nest-building example. 
But this type of structural dependence which relies on "stacking" is present in at least 
one other species. Caledonian crows are known for their cunning use of tools and 
multi-step planning. In a series of experiments Wimpenny et al. (2009) showed that 
some crows were able to master sequential tool use, meaning that they would 
effectively use a tool to make available a second tool which would in turn be used to 
gain access to food: "the most demanding condition requiring the use of three tools in 
a sequence" (Wimpenny et. al. , 2009, p. 4). Just as is the case with linguistic use of 
Merge, this implies the stacking in memory of multiple items until the desired 
outcome is expected, after which execution is carried out: 
Step l: Plan on retrieving food 
Step 2: Plan on retrieving tool A to [retrieve food.] 
Step 3: Plan on retrieving tool B to [retrieve tool A to [retrieve food.]] 
Step 4: Execute plan. 
Because the plan in Step 1 is dependent upon execution of the plan in Step 2, and 
Step 2 is not desirable except insofa~ as it allows for Step 1, with the same relation 
following throughout the following steps, all steps must be formulated in a 
hierarchical structure before being successfully carried out. Only once the entire plan 
is formulated can it be shipped to the SM system, ultimately allowing for retrieval of 
food. 
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This is strikingly similar to the operation carried out by Merge, especially if one 
overlooks the role played by lexical features . Just as was mentioned regarding human 
cognition more generally, these examples cannot be the result of Merge itself, since it 
is thought to be restricted to linguistic cognition, and relies on features for its 
structure-building. However the example of tool retrieval of Caledonian crows does 
suggest that a Merge-like process is used, implying that Merge may be related to a 
more general combinatorial capacity perhaps not restricted to human cognition, much 
less human linguistic cognition, suggesting the possibility of common descent. 
Of course such comparisons only suggest that Merge could stem from common 
descent. Similarities in traits across species can be the result of homologs or analogs 
(Stearns & Hoekstra, 2000). Whereas homologs are similar traits that are the result of 
common descent (p. 238), analogs (or homoplasy) are the result of convergent 
evolution, not shared genetic material (p. 236). To show that the capacities shared by 
New Caledonian crows and humans are the result of homology rather than analogy, 
research is required into such capacities in more closely related species, or into the 
genetic underpinnings of the capacity. 
If it could be shown that Merge is not restricted to linguistic phenomena, it may in 
fact be a boon for the MP. After all , the aims of the biolinguistics aspect of the MP is 
to show that the mechanisms involved in language can be found in other aspects of 
biology or cognition. If Merge is a broader cognitive tool, "the hypothesized role of 
UG [Universal Grammar: the genetic endowment for language acquisition] declines, 
and the task of accounting for its evolution is correspondingly eased." (Chomsky, 
2010, p. 51) Notwithstanding, this is not the approach adopted by Chomsky in his 
attempts to account for language evolution, as will be seen in chapter III, and in fact 
would run counter to his hypothesis. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
With the general claims and mechanisms of the MP laid out in this chapter, we are in 
a position to properly assess the arguments pertaining to language evolution brought 
forth by Chomsky in his writings subsequent to the articles co-authored with Hauser 
and Fitch. As will become clear, understanding the mechanisms proposed and the 
ways in which they internet is crucial to understanding how and where Chomsky's 
theory of language evolution fails. 
CHAPTER III 
MERGE AND SALT ATIONISM 
3.1. Chomsky's Minimalism and language evolution 
Up to this point we have seen Chomsky' s first systematic approach to language 
evolution in chapter I, in the article co-authored in 2002 with Hauser and Fitch. As 
argued earlier, the greatest problem with that publication was that the content of FLN, 
recursion, remained undefined and no specific mechanism was proposed to account 
for it. This is somewhat curious after having seen in chapter II how Chomsky does 
(and did) in fact have in hand the particular mechanisms within the Minimalist 
Program (henceforth MP) meant to account for language acquisition, production and 
comprehension8. As we will see in this chapter, not surprisingly, Chomsky has taken 
the findings of the MP and applied them to language evolution. The two most recent 
articles dealing explicitly and exclusively with the topic are used to surnmarize his 
views and arguments: Chomsky (2010) and Berwick & Chomsky (2011). Both 
articles advance many of the same claims and arguments, with certain additions or 
clarifications in one or the other, and are taken here as complementary and generally 
interchangeable. 
As pointed out in the introduction, Chomsky's saltationist position has been criticized 
by many, typically through proposais of alternative explanations, or through differing 
interpretation of empirical data. Most of the criticisms concem the article coauthored 
8 Although Hauser and Fitch may not have wanted to commit to the Minima list Program. 
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in 2002 with Hauser and Fitch, but few have tackled his more recent contributions to 
the language evolution debates. In this chapter my aim is to show that even accepting 
at face value the findings of the MP, Chomsky's account fails to deliver on many 
points. Remaining within the MP has the advantage of not relying on a competing 
paradigm which depends on future research to be validated, nor on the interpretation 
of empirical data, which could turn out to be contentious. 
To properly frame and critique Chomsky' s saltationist approach, I review each of the 
arguments brought forth, then proceed to examine in detail whether they stand up to 
scrutiny. In so doing, I reveal many problems with Chomsky' s arguments, 
particularly when he draws on other disciplines such as paleoanthropology or 
evolutionary biology. These issues cast doubt on the validity of his hypothesis, but 
nevertheless fail to falsify it. There is however one very significant point which is 
problematic not because of evidence garnered from other disciplines but because of 
findings from within the MP: lexical items and lexical features are virtually left out of 
the evolutionary account. Berwick and Chomsky (2011) in fact include lexical items 
in the proposed chronology of language evolution, all the while admitting ignorance 
regarding practically everything to do with them (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 40) , 
as well as making no mention of lexical features. I argue that the treatment of lexical 
items amounts to more than a simple "gap" which needs to be filled : rather inclusion 
of lexical items and lexical features in the evolutionary account precludes Chomsky' s 
saltationism. 
In sections 3.2 and 3.3 I present a summary of the content of Chomsky' s recent 
articles, laying down the premises for the arguments advanced by the authors, then 
the arguments themselves as well as the conclusions, and finally their proposed 
chronology of the evolution of the various parts of the language faculty. I follow with 
a mention of the positive aspects of Chomsky and Berwick' s account of the evolution 
of language in section 3.4. Starting with sections 3.5 and 3.6 I critically address each 
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of the points advanced in their hypothesis, casting doubt on many of their 
assumptions and conclusions. Finally, section 3.7 tackles the evolution of lexical 
items and features, showing that Chomsky' s account ignores the interacting 
mechanisms of his own MP theories, th us not only falling short of a complete account 
but also arriving at erroneous conclusions. 
3.2. Premises 
3 .2.1. Setting the stage 
Chomsky has a way of framing problems in linguistics and cognitive science such 
that they fall squarely within his own paradigm, to the exclusion of all others. 
Language evolution is no exception, as can be seen from the handful of articles he has 
written or co-authored on the topic. In these articles he recasts the problems of 
language evolution in light of the MP, claiming that "for those concerned with 
evolution of language, the minimalist program must surely be a central concem" 
(Chomsky, 2010, p. 52). Indeed for Chomsky the MP is not to be taken as a proposai 
regarding the mechanisms of the language faculty, but rather simply the impetus to 
reduce or simplify them, regardless of one' s theoretical commitments. It is thus 
claimed to be "largely theory-neutral": "whatever one's beliefs about design of 
language may be, the questions of the minimalist research program arise" (ibid., 
pp. 51-52). Chomsky thus takes for granted that "serious" (his words; ibid., p. 51) 
research into language evolution must be done through the Jens of the MP. 
If the MP were indeed theory-neutral, the above statements would be fairly 
innocuous, and simply an encouragement to researchers to curb the proliferation of 
proposed mechanisms involved in the language faculty, in the hopes of a better 
reconciliation with biology. But, as seen in chapter II, the MP does not in fact limit 
63 
itself to broad and abstract ideals regarding language study, but rather to specific 
hypotheses about the "recursive operations that enter into the computational system 
of language." (ibid., p. 52). As is evident from even that short phrase, many 
assumptions are already packed into the approach, namely that language is a 
computational system, and that it involves recursive operations. Furthermore, 
according to researchers from within the MP, that recursive operation should 
"approximate the simplest form possible, perhaps even reaching its limit" (Berwick & 
Chomsky, 2011, p. 52). Their proposed solution is the operation Merge, as seen in 
detail in chapter II. 
Chomsky' s approach to language evolution is thus to take for granted that the 
proposais of the MP will someday be vindicated; and that in the meantime the 
hypothesis that Merge is the sole syntactic operation should be taken seriously. 
Furthermore, according to Chomsky all other approaches are problematic since "any 
stipulated device beyond Merge carries a burden of proof: the complication of UG 
[Universal Grammar: the genetic endowment for language acquisition (p.51)] must be 
based on empirical evidence." (Chomsky, 2010, p. 52) This evidence is of course 
understood to be non-existent. His arguments therefore assume that Merge is the sole 
component to be accounted for, explaining- as we shall see- how he can advance a 
saltationist position with respect to the appearance of language. 
3.2.2. Human revolution and "Out of Africa" 
The first prem1se for the saltationist approach is that language appeared fairly 
recently in evolutionary time, and apparently very quickly. Evoking the 
archaeological record, both articles claim that a "fairly general consensus" among 
researchers (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 19; a similar phrase is found in Chomsky, 
2010, p. 58) places the appearance of language sometime between 100 000 and 
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50 000 years ago. This coïncides with the "great leap forward", or "human 
revolution": an explosion of human technological and cultural innovation apparent in 
the archaeological record, coupled with the migration of Homo sapiens out of Africa. 
The assumption behind this premise is that there must have been a genetic change in 
the species which would explain this sudden difference in behaviour, which is 
attributed to the appearance of language. 
3.2.3 . Species-wide language faculty 
A second premise for Chomsky' s and Berwick' s arguments, which is in fact twofold, 
is that the faculty of language is species-specific and species-wide, and that it has 
remained essentially unchanged since its appearance. They point out that a human 
infant from any part of the word can be raised in a linguistic community in any other 
part of the world and acquire the language in the host community, implying that all 
humans have the same capacity for language-learning (Chomsky 2010, p.58; Berwick 
& Chomsky 2011 , p.19-20). Thus there exists a species-specific capacity for 
language, implying that it is, at least in some measure, grounded in biology. Since it 
is also species-wide, it is also reasonable to assume that the heritable biological 
component stems from a common ancestor. lt would have furthermore remained 
unchanged since it appears to be uniform across the species. 
3.2.4. Language not for communication 
A third and somewhat more contentious premise is that language' s primary function 
is---or was- not communication, but rather thought itself. Under this approach, 
communication, dubbed in these articles as "extemalization'', happened afterwards as 
a way of externalizing thought. Berwick and Chomsky of course realise "how 
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difficult it can be to assign a unique function to an organ or trait" (Berwick & 
Chomsky, 2011, p. 25), but nevertheless attempt to demonstrate through three 
arguments that the language faculty was never designed for communication. 
1) Primary use in thinking: Their first claim is that the current use of the language 
faculty is typically for thought. They point out that "statistically speaking, for 
whatever that is worth, the overwhelming use of language is internai- for thought." 
(Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , pp. 25-26) Since, according to Chomsky and Berwick, 
language is more often used as a tool for thought than for communication, it stands to 
reason that its primary fünction was to organise thought itself. 
2) Modality-independence: Another reason taken to suggest that externalization is a 
secondary function of language is that it does not depend on a single modality. 
Recent work has shown that the full depth and capacity of spoken language is found 
in sign language as well : the structural properties, the neural localization and the 
manner of acquisition all are very similar to spoken language (Chomsky, 2010, p. 56; 
Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 32). The authors take this to imply that 
communication is an accidentai aspect of the language faculty: since the language 
faculty is able to recruit various sensory-motor systems for communication, its 
primary function must lay elsewhere. 
3) Asymmetry of interfaces: Chomsky' s last argument for communication not being 
the primary function of language is that whenever there is a conflict between 
communicative efficiency and (cognitive) computational efficiency, the latter will 
win. As seen in both the 2002 article with Hauser and Fitch and in the MP more 
generally, Chomsky proposes that the syntactic component is central to the language 
faculty, and interfaces with the Conceptual-Intentional (CI) and Sensory-Motor (SM) 
systems. However in these more recent articles it is assumed that there is an 
asymmetry in the interfaces, with the CI system being privileged over SM system 
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(Chomsky, 2010, pp. 54-55). As has been explained in chapter II, when the syntactic 
system interfaces with the SM system, certain lexical items which occur more than 
once will be suppressed, despite their use at the CI interface. This is thought to be 
because "serial motor activity is computationally costly" (Berwick & Chomsky, 
2011 , p. 31 ), and therefore "computational efficiency yields the universally attested 
facts: only the hierarchically most prominent position is pronounced." (Chomsky, 
2010, p. 55) This allows for a lightening of the computational load when it cornes to 
the SM interface, but yields ambiguities in interpretation. Computational efficiency is 
thus done at the expense of communicative efficiency. At the CI interface however, 
all lexical units are assumed to be present to allow for interpretation of the sentence. 
Thus, since computational efficiency seems to have priority over extemalization at 
the SM interface, and no such compromise exists at the CI interface, Berwick and 
Chomsky take this to mean that extemal communication is an ancillary fonction of 
language, whereas the mental aspect would be the ' true ' and original fonction of 
language. 
3.2.5 . The atoms of computation 
The final premise regards the nature of the "atoms of computation" on which Merge 
operates. Described in chapter II under the rubric "lexical items" (section 2.3 .2), their 
description is somewhat vague: they are something akin to concepts, perhaps even 
finding their roots in "conceptual structurés [ .. . ] found in other primates [ such as] 
actor-action-goal schemata, categorization, possibly the singular-plural distinction, 
and others." (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011, p. 39) Despite these tentative parallels, 
Berwick and Chomsky maintain that "the atoms of computation, lexical 
items/concepts, appear to be uniquely human." (ibid., p.39) The reason given for their 
uniqueness is their property of non-referentialism, discussed at greater length in 
chapter II. "These properties of lexical items [ viz. those which are a consequence of 
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non-referentialism] seem to be unique to human language and thought and have to be 
accounted for somehow in the study of their evolution." (ibid., p. 40) Unfortunately, 
the authors do not seem to have any leads on how to address this, and enjoin: "How, 
no one has any idea." 
3.3. Chomsky' s conclusions 
Chomsky and Berwick gather these threads together to propose what they believe to 
be the "simplest" explanation for language evolution. According to their assumptions, 
the faculty of language would have appeared suddenly, sometime between 50 000 to 
1 OO 000 years ago, with a change that would have marked a transition from having no 
linguistic competence to having full linguistic competence, essentially unchanged 
from our contemporary language faculty . From there they go on to claim that "the 
simplest assumption, hence the one we adopt unless counter-evidence appears, is that 
the generative procedure emerged suddenly as the result of a minor mutation." 
(Berwick & Chomsky, 2011, p. 29; cf. Chomsky 2010, p.55).This "minor mutation" 
would have led to great adaptability in the humans which possessed it, gaining great 
advantage with respect to natural selection, accounting for both the "great leap 
forward" and the emigration out of Africa. 
3.3. l. Merge as keystone 
That "minor mutation" yields the operation Merge. Because language is assumed to 
have appeared suddenly, "we would expect the generative procedure to be very 
simple" (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 29). This simplicity is what allows the claim 
that the language faculty is able to emerge in a single step: if the operation is so 
simple that it cannot be broken down into component parts, or sub-routines, it follows 
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that it can only have appeared fully-formed. Merge, being "the simplest mode of 
recursive generation" (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011, p. 30), fits the role perfectly. This 
is at the heart of the saltationist argument: Merge is so simple that it cannot logically 
have appeared through successive minor mutations, and therefore would have 
emerged in a single step, yielding qualitatively huge differences in the species. 
Despite its simplicity Merge is believed by Chomsky and Berwick to have 
precipitated such a great change because it would act as a keystone, drawing all other 
requisite cognitive and physiological mechanisms together to allow for language. 
Implied is the thought that the interfaces to the CI and SM systems corne 'for free', 
requiring no supplemental cognitive development. It is unclear in either article 
(Chomsky, 2010; Berwick & Chomsky, 2011) whether Merge should be understood 
as truly appearing at this time, or as being the result of an exaptation taken from a 
more general combinatorial algorithm previously present but not applied to language. 
In either case, Merge' s keystone role draws on the distinction laid out in Hauser, 
Chomsky & Fitch (2002) (see chapter I for clarifications): in this case Merge (as well 
as its interfaces to the CI and SM systems) is the only component of FLN and all 
other components necessary to language are part of FLB, thus already present when 
Merge appeared9. 
9 Chomsky has subsequently suggested (p.c. 2013) that lexical items as well may need to be 
attributed to FLN. But if this were the case, then the whole saltationist account as presented by 
Chomsky and Berwick falls a part since it hinges on the fact that Merge, a simple algorithm, cou Id 
have appeared in a single step. Additional elements in FLN indicate that a gradualist account is far 
more plausible. For a complete discussion of this and related tapies, see section 3. 7. 
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3.3.2. Communication's non-adaptationist origins 
Since the initial function of the faculty of language would not have been 
communication, but "an instrument of internai thought" (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011, 
p. 32), Merge would not immediately lead to communication. Instead, it would enable 
planning, reasoning, combination of symbols, etc. This would confer a selectional 
advantage on the individuals who possess the trait, which would therefore spread 
(Chomsky, 2010, p. 59). Only later (at some unspecified time) would the sensory-
motor system be recruited to start externalizing these thoughts, which again would 
lead to a selectional advantage. Note however that in this scenario the entire language 
faculty is not the fruit of selection for communication, but rather appeared fully 
· formed thanks to a minor mutation, which only incidentally-and later-allowed for 
communication. 
According to Berwick and Chomsky, there is furthermore good reason to believe that 
the communication that stems from the use of the language faculty is not only 
secondary, but not an adaptation. Since spoken languages vary widely from one 
population to another subject to the vagaries of cultural change, "it follows that 
extemalization may not have evolved at ail" (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 38), 
explaining the Jack of species-wide uniformity. lt is supposed that the "problem of 
extemalization"-that is, the particulars of the mapping of Merge to the SM 
system-would have happened once the language faculty was in place, "a problem 
addressed by existing cognitive processes, in different ways, and at different times." 
(ibid., p. 38) The development of language for communication would therefore imply 
no biological change-and consequently no evolutionary change-in the organisms. 
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3.3.3. No proto-language 
According to Chomsky and Berwick, this account precludes the possibility of any 
sort of proto-language. Language would have appeared with Merge, whose simplicity 
precludes its appearance through successive steps. As a result, there could not have 
been a simpler precursor to Merge which could have been added onto or complexified 
in order to yield Merge. According to Chomsky (2010), there nevertheless "are many 
proposals involving precursors with a stipulated bound on Merge" (p.53) which 
would allow for the combination of only two words, then later in evolutionary time 
three words, then four, etc. But "there is no rationale for postulation of such a system: 
to go from seven-word sentences to the discrete infinity of human language requires 
the same recursive procedure as to go from zero to infinity" (Berwick & Chomsky, 
2011 , p. 31 ). There is furthermore "no empirical evidence from the historical or 
archaeological record for such stipulations" (Chomsky, 2010, p. 53). Since language 
is defined through the use of Merge, and having Merge is a binary (you have it or you 
don't), it follows that no additional steps can be added without arbitrary 
complications of the evolutionary account. 
3.3.4. Chronology oflanguage evolution 
Having reached the conclusions outlined above, Berwick and Chomsky propose a 
sequence for when these various elements would have evolved in a broad chronology 
of language evolution. The first element they assume to have appeared is the lexical 
items: "In some completely unknown way, our ancestors developed human 
concepts." (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 40) Repeating the ignorance admitted to 
earlier regarding lexical items (and attributed to the entire body of research), no 
specific timeline or trigger is given for this element of the language faculty. 
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The next element which would have appeared is Merge. It is assumed to have 
happened "at some time in the very recent past, maybe about 75 000 years ago" 
(Berwick & Chomsky, 2011 , p. 40). As explained earlier, a slight rewiring of the 
brain would have taken place, allowing the use of Merge on the previously developed 
concepts. 
The final stage is the recruitment of the sensory-motor system for the use of spoken 
or gestured language. Berwick and Chomsky explain: "At some later stage, the 
intemal language of thought was connected to the sensory-motor system, a complex 
task that can be solved in many different ways and at different times, and quite 
possibly a task that involves no evolution at all." (2011 , p. 41) This satisfies the 
assumption that the language faculty was not primarily for communication, and is 
thought to account for the variety of spoken and signed languages. 
This completes the summary of Chomsky and Berwick' s account of the evolution of 
the language faculty, broken down into premises and conclusions. This structure 
allows for a clear picture of the theory, which in turn facilitates the critique which 
will follow. 
3.4. Strengths of the theory 
Before picking apart the account above, it is worth pointing out that despite its 
shortcomings, it does have many positive aspects . One thing that language evolution 
theories must account for is the selection pressures that would have led to the 
development of the language faculty. Why would Homo sapiens, of all primates, 
mammals or even species, be the only species with such a complex and explicit 
communication system (or soit seems)? There must have been selection pressures at 
work which would not have been present for other species. This is a difficult problem 
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for all language evolution theories (and evolutionary psychology in general) since, as 
Durrant & Haig (2001) point out "we are barred from access to the appropriate 
detailed information about ancestral environments [ such as] relevant data conceming 
genetic differences, reproductive success, and so on" (Durrant & Haig, 2001 , p. 359). 
Since the environment of evolutionary adaptedness relating to language evolution is 
long gone, researchers are at pains to provide convincing evidence regarding the 
selection pressures proposed in their models (see Laland & Brown, 2011 , pp. 124-128 
for a critical discussion of this problem). 
Chomsky' s model partly succeeds in sidestepping this issue insofar as it does not 
require feedback from the environment for the shaping of Merge since it appeared in 
a single step. Of course selection pressures were needed to maintain and spread the 
trait in the population, but recall that Merge' s appearance is assumed to have allowed 
for a full language faculty ovemight. In such a case, it is easy to imagine that the 
"capacities for complex thought, planning, interpretation, and so on" (Chomsky, 
2010, p. 59) that came along with it would have bestowed a great selectional 
advantage on the individuals and groups in which it was present. Their increased 
survival is thus virtually guaranteed in practically any environment. as testified by 
"Out of Africa" and the spread of humans all over the globe. Chomsky' s theory 
consequently practically obviates the need for the identification of specific selection 
pressures associated with language. Notwithstanding, it only partly succeeds in 
sidestepping the issue since all aspects of FLB which precede the appearance of 
Merge must still be accounted for by identification of the functions and selection 
pressures, thereby also identifying how they could have been present for 
(presumably) some time before being recruited to the language faculty. These aspects 
are not addressed by Chomsky or Berwick. 
The most positive aspect of Chomsky' s account is that it proposes very specific 
mechanisms meant to explain the operations of the language faculty, and attempts to 
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account for them through evolutionary biology. As Steels (2000) puts it: "only clear 
scientific models that explain how language evolved (as opposed to enumerating 
conditions why language evolved) can be expected to steer us away from the many 
speculations that made the field suspect for a long time." (p. 18) By proposing that 
language is produced through Merge and the interfaces to the SM and CI systems, 
Chomsky provides a strong and ostensibly falsifiable hypothesis regarding the 
language faculty. This in turn narrows significantly the possible evolutionary 
accounts for the appearance of language, providing the basis for a clear and precise 
history of its biological evolution. Note that this was the main criticism levelled in 
chapter I at the Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002) article: their proposai that the 
property of "recursion" was the sole component of FLN fell short of providing a 
complete and clear hypothesis for language evolution since it failed to actually 
propose a specific mechanism. By approaching the issue through the MP, Chomsky 
solves this problem, although by the same token opens up his account to further 
criticism. 
3 .5. Critiques of premises 
Many of the points made in sections 3 .2 and 3 .3 can be called into question, at times 
because the research in relevant disciplines is not so clear-cut, at times because there 
are logical leaps in the conclusions, or apparent misunderstandings with respect to the 
principles of evolutionary biology. Each of the sub-sections below refers to a 
corresponding subsection above, and suggests, where possible, why each of the 
premises or conclusions may be problematic. 
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3.5.1. The Minimalist Program at center stage 
As mentioned in chapter II (section 2.2.2), notwithstanding Chomsky' s claims, many 
researchers have rejected the MP, implying that it is far from theory neutral. One 
need only look to the work of Ray Jackendoff (2002, 2010), Philip Liberman (2002), 
Paul Postal (2004), and dozens of other prominent researchers to see that the MP is 
not necessarily the leading paradigm in linguistics, much less the only possible 
approach. The relevance of Chomsky' s framing of language evolution exclusively in 
terms of the MP is therefore done at the exclusion of many other approaches, which 
may be in a position to propose alternative hypotheses regarding the evolution of the 
language faculty (for more on this see Jackendoff, 2010: "Y our theory of language 
evolution depends on your theory of language"-but see also Clark, 2013 , for a 
rebuttal). Nevertheless, beginning with specific (as yet non-falsified) hypotheses 
about the content of the language faculty is a good start for research into language 
evolution. 
3.5.2. Human revolution 
Much of Chomsky' s argument centers on a very fast development of human 
cognition around 75 000 years ago, purportedly explainable only through the 
acquisition of language in humans. In the 1980' s, archaeologists did indeed coin the 
term "human revolution" to indicate the apparent discontinuity brought about by a 
sudden increase in technology and culture some 40 000 years ago (Meilars & 
Stringer, 1989). However, as Hoffecker (2007) points out, "the extent to which the 
apparent discontinuity in the archaeological record at this time-as modem humans 
move their act from Africa to Europe-is due to contrast in archaeological visibility 
between the two continents (e.g. quantity of excavated sites, caves versus open-air 
localities) is still unclear." (p. 376) Other researchers (e.g. McBearty & Brooks 2000) 
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propose that there never was a "great leap", and that the features attributed to the so-
called revolution are found in the records of the African Middle Stone Age, tens or 
even hundreds of thousands of years earlier. Additionally, according to their account, 
not only did these elements appear earlier, but also more gradually, as opposed to in a 
single leap. 
Furthermore, the "human revolution" may not be relevant to a saltationist argument 
since cognitive and technological developments do not always go hand in hand. 
Behme (2014) in a review of a recent publication by Chomsky (2012) argues that 
it is not entirely clear that a detectable change in technology is a reliable 
indicator for an increase in overall intelligence and/or the arrivai of 
linguistic abilities. By analogy, comparing the "archaeological record" of 
hurnan technology of the 17th and 20th century a scientist of the 44th 
century might conclude that our species underwent a dramatic increase in 
intelligence during this time period. (p.15) 
Interestingly, this argument rests on Chomsky's own competence/performance 
distinction: the capacity for technological innovation ( competence) and the actual 
innovations themselves (performance) do not necessarily follow one another closely. 
Moreover, there could have been a biological or cognitive change other than the 
appearance of language that explains the human revolution, such as finer motor skills 
for tool-making or cognitive developments for non-language-specific symbolic 
representation. There are thus reasons to question that the "great leap forward" was 
truly the consequence of a sudden biological change to the faculty of language, rather 
than some other biological transformation or change through accumulation of cultural 
knowledge. 
Since the "human revolution" plays such a major role in Chomsky's saltationist 
argument, its falsification would be a very significant blow to his position. Note 
however that it would not result in an invalidation of the saltationist argument, but 
merely a removal of the impetus for its supposition. Y et despite the arguments 
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outlined in this section, it is fair to say that most researchers in the fields of 
archaeology and paleoanthropology do believe that the "human revolution" happened 
at some point in the past, and link it to cognitive sophistication and language 
development (see McBearty & Brooks 2000, p.453-454, 486 for an overview of the 
literature). Chomsky and Berwick' s premise, though not as self-evident as it may 
seem, is nevertheless fairly reasonable. 
3.5.3. Species-wide language faculty 
This is probably the least contentious premise as it claims very little, namely that 
humans have a shared biological capacity to learn language. Note that it is not 
necessary to assume anything in particular about the biological capacity: arguments 
about its nature, size, specificity, etc. are not affected by the acceptance that there is a 
species-wide capacity for language. The only implication of this premise is that there 
is a biological capacity for language, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that it 
results from a common ancestor. 
3.5.4. Language not for communication 
1) Primary use in thinking: It is advanced that language is more often used for 
thought than it is for communication, implying that thought is the primary function of 
the language faculty. This argument suffers from two setbacks, the first of which is 
that it apparently relies entirely on intuition rather than data: no research is referenced 
to back up this fact (cf. similar unsubstantiated claims in Chomsky 2010, p.55, 
Chomsky 2012, pp. 11-12, Chomsky 2013). Nevertheless, it does sound intuitively 
plausible, although the particulars would need to be spelled out in order to 
demonstrate it. For instance, is thought truly, or always, language-based, as opposed 
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to image-based, or based in some other medium? And if internai thought is ' in a 
language' (e.g. English, French, etc.), then what would it have been like before 
externalized language existed (Jackendoff 2011 , p.613)? Viger (2007) even proposes 
that the language of thought is acquired through public speech, in which case even if 
current use of language is mostly thought, that language would be impossible without 
the communication from which it stems. The claim therefore is not only unsupported, 
but runs up against contradictory intuitions, calling into question its legitimacy. 
The second important setback to this argument is that even if the claim were 
empirically demonstrated, current function need not reflect the original function (cf. 
Laland & Brown, 2011 , p. 92). This is obvious when one thinks of exaptations, where 
the current function is by definition not the original function. Berwick and Chomsky 
however seem to realize how weak the argument is, couching it as they do in 
dismissive terms: "for whatever it' s worth ... " 
2) Modality-independence: Chomsky and Berwick argue that the fact that the 
language faculty can recruit speech or sign for communication is an indication that 
communication is a secondary aspect. The fact that sign languages as we know them 
are a relatively recent invention should not detract from this argument since there is a 
"long but checkered history" (Corballis, 2011 , p. 57) of theories whereby language 
evolved from manual gestures, with speech arriving only later (see Corballis, 2011 ; 
pp. 57-59 for a short history). The argument is however otherwise quite weak since 
the complete opposite point could be made with the same premise: since the language 
faculty is able to use any modality for communication, it could be said to be perfectly 
suited for communication, able to use whatever means at its disposai to do so. This 
could imply that it is an adaptation for communication. Evidently, more research is 
needed before the modality-independence of language is brought to bear on this 
argument. 
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3) Asymmetry of interfaces: Finally, Chomsky and Berwick argue that since the 
language faculty is more efficient at the interface to the CI system than it is to the SM 
system, it follows that thought is a primary function of the language faculty, and 
communication a secondary fonction. Much, if not all , of this argument depends on 
acceptance of the research coming out of the MP, including the CI and SM systems, 
the nature of the interfaces, as well as particulars of sentence generation outlined in 
chapter. II. As was mentioned earlier, many researchers have adopted other ways of 
studying language which have led them to posit far different mechanisms and 
cognitive architectures. Notwithstanding, from within the MP, the argument does 
appear to be well-formulated. 
Nevertheless, talk of language' s "primary fonction" does not seem to mesh with 
certain principles of evolutionary biology and even with Chomsky' s saltationist 
approach more generally. The definition of a "function" has been hotly debated in 
biology and philosophy of biology throughout the 20th century. The emerging 
consensus was that a function is an effect which has been selected for (Wright 1976, 
Millikan 1984, Kitcher 1993). This in turn highlights the difference between an 
adaptation and a character which is merely adaptive. As Laland & Brown (2011) 
explain, an adaptation has been "favoured by natural selection for its effectiveness in 
a particular role" (p.91 ), whereas a character is adaptive if it currently mcreases 
reproductive success (note that a trait can also be both or neither). 
If Merge (as a trait) remained and spread, then there must have been some positive 
selection pressure on it, therefore it must have a fonction. However because of the 
saltationist scenario, its current efficiency at various tasks tells us nothing about the 
selection pressures leading to its proliferation. Since Merge and the CI and SM 
systems are claimed not to have evolved since Merge appeared, it follows that their 
current state is identical to their state at the time when Merge first appeared. Yet for it 
to even be possible that the relative efficiency at the interfaces be an indicator of 
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original function, Chomsky and Berwick would need to concede that natural selection 
played a role in increasing the efficiency at the CI interface relative to the SM 
interface. In other words, that greater efficiency would need to be an adaptation, not 
merely adaptive. However their saltationist account is also non-adaptationist, 
admitting of no further evolution after Merge' s appearance, thus precluding the 
possibility that selection pressures had an effect on the shaping of the faculty of 
language. This implies that whatever relative efficiency is present cannot be the result 
of the tinkering of evolution, and therefore cannot be an indicator of primary 
function. 
To demonstrate that thought was the primary function of the faculty of Ianguage in 
Chomsky' s scenario, one would need to show empirical evidence, presumably 
archaeological, that initial selection pressures were for the capacity for thought as 
opposed to communication, despite the fact that both capacities were available from 
the outset. No archaeological evidence of the sort has been proposed in Chomsky' s 
writings, and indeed it is hard to imagine what that evidence would look like. The 
fact that the language faculty would be more efficient at the CI interface is therefore 
simply a matter of happenstance, and suggests nothing regarding its original role. 
Besides, the fact that there are constraints that exist on the SM system which do not 
apply to the CI system may be related to the particulars of the systems themselves 
rather than computational efficiency constraints. For instance, the SM system seems 
to require serialization of linguistic output, even in the case of sign languages (which 
could in principle communicate in parallel using both hands) (Berwick & Chomsky, 
2011, p. 32), whereas the CI system may not. 
All the arguments advanced to support the premise that language is or was not 
primarily for communication are thus problematic. Nevertheless, it has not been 
demonstrated that language's primary use was communication, nor that it is 
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impossible for language' s primary use to have been for thought. These arguments 
thus leave the debate still open, with consequences that shall become apparent in 
section 3.6.2: Communication' s non-adaptationist origins. 
3.5.5. The atoms of computation 
The main criticism regarding this premise is of course just how vague it is. The 
conflation of words, concepts and animal cognition needs to be jÙstified, as well as 
the changes from "conceptual structures" of other species to those we humans 
currently possess. These issues, as well as how the lexical items fit into the proposed 
chronology of language evolution will be addressed at greater length in section 3. 7. 
3.5.6. Premises: summary 
In sum, of all the premises proposed by Chomsky and Berwick, the least contentious 
is the fact that humans possess a species-wide and species-specific language faculty, a 
premise accepted by most researchers in the field . The human revolution, the main 
impetus for the saltationist claim, is contentious within the fields of 
paleoanthropology and archaeology, but has nevertheless not been discounted. None 
of the remaining premises, be it the validity of the MP, the secondary role of 
communication, or the atoms of computation, have been demonstrated and remain 
open for debate, or in need of further research. 
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3.6. Chomsky's conclusions revisited 
Chomsky and Berwick present what they believe to be the simplest assumption for 
language evolution, namely that language appeared in a single step, with the 
appearance of Merge. As mentioned in chapter 1 (section 1.1.3), saltations are thought 
to be the result of small genotypic alterations that confer a large discontinuous change 
in the phenotype. If that is the case, then language' s appearance in a single step can 
be the simplest assumption only insofar as it can plausibly be related to a small 
change in genotype. Furthermore if saltations are considered rare, as some researchers 
maintain, then any claim to a saltation must be justified by showing that alternative 
gradualist scenarios fail to account for the trait. One way of satisfying both these 
criteria without relying on genetic analysis is to argue as Gould (1980) did that the 
given trait admits of no intermediate steps, as is the case with the movable joint of 
boid snakes (see section 1.1.3). The implicit justification behind this approach is that 
the genotypic change need not be specified if the phenotypic change cannot be 
divided into multiple steps. The idea is that no matter how many genotypic changes 
were actually necessary to produce Merge, at some point one of those changes (the 
last one) produced the change in the phenotype that led to the appearance of Merge 
where there was no Merge before. In other words, the argument requires there to be 
no genotypic change that could have led to any part of Merge without all of Merge. 
Chomsky and Berwick's saltationist argument needs therefore to be justified through 
evidence of a large discontinuous change in the species, and the fact that the trait(s) 
responsible for that change admit of no intermediate steps. 
The principal reason Chomsky and Berwick assume that it is necessary to advance the 
saltationist claim is the acceptance of the "human revolution" theory. By their lights, 
since there is a large discontinuous change to atcount for, the proposal of a saltation 
to account for it is warranted. But how fast must change be in the archaeological 
record for it to be explainable only through saltations? According to Laland & Brown 
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(2011), research in the 1990's showed that "biological selection may be extremely 
fast, with significant genetic and phenotypic changes sometimes observed in just a 
handful of generations" (p. 133). In terms of the archaeological record, a swift change 
may be perceived as a sudden break when in fact it is a gradual-albeit very fast-
change. Nevertheless, as discussed in section 3.5.2, although the existence of the 
"human revolution" is not without controversy, there is no knock-down evidence or 
argument against either the claim that it happened, or that it is the result of a saltation 
affecting language. Let us therefore assume for the sake of argument that it stands and 
tum instead towards other more clearly problematic parts of the argument. 
Berwick and Chomsky claim that saltationism is the "simplest" conclusion, but it is 
"simple" only insofar as it is taken for granted that the language faculty hinges upon a 
single extremely simple algorithm, as opposed to a complex network of interacting 
parts. Compare for instance the fictitious and obviously false claim that a bird's 
wings appeared suddenly rather than through multiple successive steps, since it is a 
simpler assumption. Indeed it is simpler insofar as it reduces the number of steps 
needed to explain its evolution, but it is also incredibly implausible and therefore 
considered absurd. The reason why it seems impossible is because of the complexity 
of a bird's wing, involving as it does not only bones, muscles, nerves, veins, feathers, 
etc. but also a very specific architecture of moving parts in order to allow for flight, 
not to mention the brain structures dedicated to its control. This is why complexity is 
generally taken as a measure of plausibility of a gradualist evolutionary account; 
Pinker and Bloom (1990) observe that "the only successful account of the origin of 
complex biological structure is the theory of natural selection" (p. 710) and that the 
language faculty is just one of those complex structures. The question to be asking 
regarding the saltationist position is consequently to what extent language is simple 
or complex. If indeed it is extremely simple, then one might be able to argue that it 
appeared in a single step. Note however that the saltationist claim in this case would 
not be warranted so much because of "simplicity" or theoretical parsimony, but rather 
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because the mechanism is so simple that it could not have evolved in successive 
steps. This is precisely what Chomsky argues, as is clear from his conclusions 
regarding the inexistence of proto-language (see sections 3.5.3 and 3.6.3). 
The simplicity claim regarding saltational evolution therefore rests on the simplicity 
of the language faculty. Incidentally, the MP's whole purpose is to reduce the 
mechanisms of the language to a minimum, so it is not surprising that the application 
of MP research to language evolution would lead them to the conclusion that the 
language faculty evolved through very few and very simple steps, perhaps even a 
single one. There is thus a certain circularity in the argument: the simplest assumption 
is that language evolved in a single step, but only because it is assumed that the 
language faculty is very simple, an assumption meant to help explain its biology, and 
therefore its evolution. The assertions regarding the language faculty and its evolution 
therefore both rest on the same unverified assumption of the desirability of 
"simplicity" and each plays arole in validating the other. 
3.6.1. Merge as keystone 
The circularity of the argument becomes more apparent at this point, when Berwick 
and Chomsky assert that it is because language appeared so suddenly that the 
generative procedure must be simple (Berwick & Chomsky, 2011, p. 29). As argued 
in the previous sub-section, the saltation claim itself rests on the assumption of a 
simple generative procedure, without which such a sudden change would be too 
implausible. But the language evolution theory is ostensibly based on the 
understanding of the language faculty, as testified by Chomsky's writing (2010): 
"Study of evolution of some system is feasible only to the extent that its nature is 
understood. [ . . . ] Accordingly, a sensible approach is to begin with properties of 
language which are understood with some confidence" (p. 45). This approach is later 
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termed "the only reasonable approach for inquiry into the evolution of any system." 
(p. 52) In contrast, by arguing that the saltationist claim warrants the expectation that 
the language faculty arose thanks to a single simple operation, Chomsky flips the 
argument on its head, putting the weight of the argument on the evolutionary history 
rather than knowledge of the mechanisms involved. To a certain extent this 
contradicts his own "reasonable approach"; although to be clear, it does not invalidate 
his conclusions. Indeed it could be argued that the human revolution justifies the 
saltationist claim, which in turn substantiates the postulation of the simple recursive 
algorithm. However if the whole argument rests on the shaky foundation of the 
hurnan revolution along with the assumption that it results from a biological change, 
then the argument erected upon it seems more and more precarious. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in explaining the keystone role for Merge is accounting 
for the evolution of the mechanisms ofFLB. If Merge is the only mechanism in FLN, 
and its appearance signalled the end of the evolution of the language faculty, then all 
the other components included in FLB must have evolved previously. This implies 
that mechanisms such as the CI and SM systems, lexical items, lexical features, 
phonology, semantics, etc. are either adaptations for some other unspecified function 
other than language, or the result of the interfaces to the CI and SM systems . 
Chomsky and Berwick are mute on how this could be possible. 
3.6.2. Comrnunication' s non-adaptationist origins 
Considering that the premises on which this conclusion rests have been shown to be 
at the very least problematic (section 3.5.4), the fact that language's communicative 
aspect is not an adaptation is far from demonstrated. Y et if the premises were 
abandoned, it may seem at first glance that the only requirement would be to drop the 
conclusion that communication does not have an adaptationist origin. In other words, 
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the conclusion does not seem to convey much more than the premises do, and they 
seem to relate only to one another. 
In fact, much is at stake: communication must be a secondary, non-adaptationist by-
product of the evolution of the language faculty if the saltationist argument is to hold. 
Consider for instance how a gradualist account of language evolution could propose 
that elementary aspects of communication appeared early (in one way or another), 
with further aspects or mechanisms spreading through selection pressures on 
communication, leading to an adaptationist account of communication and the 
language faculty (see e.g. Bickerton, 2009a). By contrast, Chomsky cannot assume a 
graduai development of communication, because it is antithetical to the saltationist 
position: if communication was fashioned through selection pressures and successive 
adaptations, then the language faculty itself would have been shaped by selection, 
implying that the saltationist position is impossible. Thus he could accept an 
adaptationist history to communication only at the expense of his saltationist claim. 
Of course, he could argue that any communication prior to the development of the 
complete language faculty is simply not language by definition: non-linguistic 
communication evolved and recruited-or was recruited by-the language faculty 
once it appeared fully formed. But such an alternative seems at best a play on 
definitions, and at worst a disingenuous attempt at safeguarding one's theory (but 
Chomsky has not argued this-at least not quite: see section 3.6.3). The question is 
therefore whether Chomsky has convincingly argued that communication is a by-
product of the language faculty, or whether the adaptationist account of language-as-
communication has been demonstrated. 
To bolster his account of communication as a secondary function of language, 
Chomsky proposes that the non-adaptationist origin of communication is a way to 
explain the apparent variety of spoken and gestured languages across the world. Y et 
contrary to what Berwick and Chomsky imply, the variety of externalized languages 
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is compatible with an adaptationist origin to communication. After ail, in an 
adaptationist account it is the underlying mechanisms that allow externalization 
which are the result of selection pressures, not the externalized and culturally-
influenced particular language. Thus there could be a uniform set of mechanisms 
across the species evolved for externalization of language that would nevertheless 
provide flexibility with respect to the communication modalities needed to account 
for variety in externalized language. On the other hand, Chomsky' s proposai as well 
is logically plausible. He argues that the relevant mechanisms either were already 
present when Merge appeared and therefore any selection pressures applied to them 
have no relation to the language faculty, or corne "for free" with the interface 
between Merge and the SM system, entailing no pressure from natural selection for 
communication. The variety of languages thus does not a priori tip the balance for or 
against an account of language origins involving adaptation for communication. 
However there is empirical evidence that suggests vanous aspects of speech 
production and comprehension did evolve for communication. For instance, research 
into the FOXP2 gene (Enard, et al. , 2002) has shown that this gene is implicated in 
certain linguistic disabilities, such as "severe articulation disabilities accompanied by 
linguistic and grammatical impairment'', and has "been the target of selection during 
recent human evolution" (p. 869). The gene therefore is related to extemalization of 
language, and perhaps other aspects of language such as grammar (see Marcus & 
Fisher, 2003 , p. 258 for a summary of the debate surrounding the nature of the 
neurobiological deficits ), as well as having apparently undergone selection pressure, 
making it an adaptation, presumably for communication. Other aspects as well, such 
as enhanced breathing control (MacLarnon & Hewitt 1999), and the "Speech is 
Special" hypothesis (see Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005, pp. 206-208 for a review of the 
relevant research) have all been advanced to support the hypothesis that the faculty of 
language evolved through selection pressures related to communication. All the same, 
Berwick and Chomsky dismiss these claims, spending some time arguing that FOXP2 
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(at the very least) "does not speak to the question of the core faculty of human 
language" (2011 , p. 34) since it may be related to motor coordination more generally. 
Thus 
the link between FOXP2 and high-grade serial motor coordination could 
be regarded as either an opportunistic prerequisite substrate for 
externalization, no matter what the modality, as is common in 
evolutionary scenarios, or the result of selection pressure for efficient 
externalization solutions after Merge arose. (p. 34) 
In the first scenario the saltationist story is preserved, since the relevant modifications 
to FOXP2 are assumed to have happened before Merge and therefore would be part 
of FLB. However in the second scenario, there is selection pressure related to 
communication, which happens after the appearance of Merge, apparently 
invalidating the conclusion that language' s communicative aspects are not an 
adaptation. Yet Berwick and Chomsky enjoin: "In either case, FOXP2 becomes part 
of a system extrinsic to core syntax/semantics." (p. 34) In other words, insofar as they 
can maintain that the selection pressure for "efficient extemalization solutions" did 
not impact the generative procedure, their saltationist approach is mostly preserved 
since the major components they believe constitute the language faculty- Merge and 
the interfaces to the CI and SM systems- remain essentially unchanged. 
In sum, the non-adaptationist account of language's communication aspects has not 
been demonstrated, and indeed there may be empirical support for the opposite 
conclusion. If it could be robustly demonstrated that various parts of the internai 
mechanisms of the language faculty evolved through selection for communication 
and not any other selection pressure, it would be a hard blow for Chomsky' s 
hypothesis, eliminating the saltationist aspect. However in many cases the data are 
inconclusive or at best debatable, as is the case for instance with the FOXP2 research. 
Piattelli-Palmarini & Uriageka (2011) argue that many researchers are making 
inferences regarding the linguistic phenotype of FOXP2 based on coarse brain 
correlates, with different publications disagreeing over the functions of the implicated 
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brain regions (p. 1 OO). Furthermore, "without a deeper understanding of development 
and, especially, of the human-specific aspects of human development, we are not 
likely to be able to make many definite connections between high-level phenotypes 
and the role of early-acting regulatory genes [like FOXP2]." (Preuss, 2012, p. 10714) 
In other words, in many cases more research is needed to understand the link between 
brain regions, cognitive capacities and linguistic capacity, as well as between genes 
and brain development, to assess claims regarding the evolutionary development of 
communication. 
3.6.3 . No proto-language 
Chomsky's argument regarding the absence of a proto-language depends entirely on 
his definition of language. For Chomsky, "a person's language is a computational 
system of the mind/brain that generates an infinite array of hierarchically structured 
expressions" (2010, p. 45). Since the generative procedure is thought to be the result 
of the application of Merge upon lexical items, and Merge could only have appeared 
in a single step, then by definition language appears with Merge. However, if 
language is defined instead through aspects relating to communication, then the 
possibilities for a proto-language are many. Communication through language calls 
on many properties which potentially could have appeared in various steps, such as 
displacement, combinatoriality, recursion, reference (although not for Chomsky), 
symbolism, duality of patteming, etc. Note that even within Chomsky' s framework, 
at least some of these properties could have succeeded one another, perhaps even 
before the appearance of Merge, since they do not imply anything with respect to 
Chomsky's definition of language. In other words, properties such as displacement or 
symbolism presumably could have appeared before Merge, since they need not be 
connected to syntax in any way, relating as they do even to single lexical items. 
89 
Chomsky' s definition of language thus precludes a proto-language, but does not 
preclude proto-communication. 
If the possibility of a proto-language in Chomsky' s sense is quasi logically 
incoherent, it follows that the "many proposais" invoked which posit a stipulated 
limitation on Merge are at best implausible. Not surprisingly, no published work 
seems to actually propose any such limitation on Merge. Behme, in a review of 
Chomsky (2012), contacted sixteen notable researchers in the field (among others 
Jackendoft, Newmeyer, Christiansen, Corballis, Lieberman and Bickerton) and asked 
them if they embraced a theory whereby there were stipulated limitations on Merge at 
some point in the early stages of its evolution. All the researchers denied their 
adherence to such a position, with Behme concluding that "the consensus was: "This 
is a theoretical straw man if 1 ever saw one"" (Behme, 2013 , p. 102). Indeed when 
proto-language is posited, it is not by a researcher in the MP, and therefore does not 
typically rely on Merge. 
3.7. Chronology revisited 
The chronology oflanguage evolution proposed by Chomsky is quite straightforward: 
first came lexical items in some unknown way, then Merge through a random 
mutation, then externalization through exaptation of the SM system. Not only does 
this linear progression seem simplistic compared to the complexities it attempts to 
capture, it also disregards much of the research in the MP. The greatest lacuna is no 
doubt the lack of any explanation regarding the appearance of lexical items. In fact, 
although Chomsky (2010) does advance the non-referentialist thesis regarding words 
(see sections 2.3.2 and 3.2.5, this paper), and mentions that words are a difficult 
problem for language evolution (p.57) that must be accounted for (p.62), he does not 
address the evolution of words any further. On the other hand, Berwick and Chomsky 
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(2011) do include lexical items in the chronology summarized above. Both articles 
are problematic for two main reasons, tackled in the following paragraphs: the first is 
that lexical items and the features they carry play a major role in the generative 
procedure proposed within the MP and cannot therefore be brushed aside as a detail 
to be sorted out later. The second is that the role they do play is such that the 
chronology proposed by Berwick and Chomsky (2011) is, to say the least, unlikely. 
Regarding this second critique 1 will first summarize Boeckx' s (2011) proposai that it 
is lexical items rather than Merge that led to the sudden emergence of language. 
Second, 1 will follow with Jackendoff s (2010) point that many features are inert 
without syntax, and to posit their appearance before Merge is therefore at best 
implausible. Jackendoff nevertheless believes that research within the MP is bound to 
a saltationist account. Third, 1 present Clark' s (2013) article wherein he argues, 
against Jackendoff (2010), that the MP is amenable to a gradualist account. Finally, 1 
argue that not only is the MP amenable to a gradualist account, the mechanisms it 
proposes practically force it into a gradualist scenario regarding the evolution of the 
language faculty. 
3. 7 .1. The case of the missing lexical items 
The role of lexical items, and more specifically lexical features, is major within the 
MP, and therefore must be addressed in any evolutionary account brought forward . 
Yet as mentioned previously, the evolution of words is left unexplained in both 
Chomsky (2010) and Berwick and Chomsky (2011), ostensibly due to a lack of 
knowledge regarding them. Y et as was shown in the previous chapter, Merge on its 
own does not account for the generative aspect of language, relying as it does on 
lexical features to licence further applications of Merge. This problematic absence of 
any explanation for lexical features in Chomsky's account of language evolution has 
been pointed out by certain authors. As mentioned in section 2.5 .2, Bickerton (2009b) 
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remarks in passing that the omission of lexical items in fact precludes recursivity 
itself since "it is the fact that words (and combinations of words) have dependencies 
that must be filled which drives repeated applications of Merge until the problem is 
solved-that is, until the complete grammatical sentence is generated." (footnote 2, 
pp. 6-7) The recursive process is thus the consequence of the interaction between the 
combinatorial process and the atoms of that combination, which "force it to result in a 
hierarchical structure" (footnote 2, p. 7). Jackendoff (2011) puts forward the same 
argument, simplifying and summarizing it nicely: "recursive structures cannot exist 
without units to combine" (p. 599). The importance of lexical items could not have 
been overlooked by Chomsky or Berwick since they each participate actively in 
research within the MP, both writing articles which rely heavily on features as a 
mechanism for syntax (cf. Chomsky 1995, 2005; Berwick 2011 ; Berwick et al. 2011). 
It is thus curious that such an important aspect of the generative procedure would be 
left mostly unaccounted for. Needless to say, lexical items and their features need to 
be included in any account of language evolution within the MP, and their appearance 
justified through evolutionary biology. 
3.7.2. Boeckx: saltationism through lexical items 
Of course Berwick and Chomsky (2011) do mention that lexical units need to have 
evolved, placing their appearance before Merge, a proposai contested by Boeckx 
(2011). The justification found in Berwick & Chomsky (2011) for the appearance of 
lexical units is essentially hand waving to parallels between human concepts and 
concepts possessed by other primates, which presumably suggests that they could 
have arisen through graduai evolution from those common roots. 
Boeckx (2011) argues from within the MP framework, adopting most of the 
scaffolding used by Chomsky, including the mechanisms posited within the MP, the 
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idea that externalization of language was secondary and involved no evolution (p.62), 
as well as the saltationist approach (p.46) . Just as Chomsky does, Boeckx proposes 
that the language faculty evolved in a single step and recruited older cognitive and 
physiological traits for use in language. However the key component of FLN is not 
thought to be Merge, but rather the lexical features : "the edge feature [i.e. lexical 
features], the catalyst for recursive Merge, is the one key property that had to evolve." 
(ibid., p. 54) Although Boeckx is very clear that lexical features and Merge are both 
essential to a fully-formed language faculty, it is unclear when Merge is thought to 
have evolved. He does argue that "set formation [i.e. the application of Merge] is a 
very basic computational operation, one that is unlikely to be unique to humans or 
specific to language" (ibid., p. 52), suggesting that he believes that Merge would have 
appeared far earlier than lexical features. This relates to a point made in section 2.6, 
wherein 1 argued that Merge alone is essentially a simple combinatorial algorithm, 
likely to be found in other species. lt is therefore plausible that Merge is a very old 
cognitive tool, developed by a common ancestor to many species. Y et despite 
acknowledging the role of lexical features and downplaying the significance of 
Merge, Boeckx nevertheless maintains the saltationist position, for much the same 
reasons Chomsky and Berwick do (adopting the premises of the species-wide 
language faculty, the human revolution, and communication as a by-product). 
Altemately, Boeckx's insistence on the saltationist account despite his divergence 
from Chomsky's emphasis on Merge ' s appearance may be due to his commitment to 
the MP, if J ackendoff (2010) is to be believed. 
3.7.3. Jackendoff: the MP precludes gradualism 
Indeed Jackendoff (2011) argues that "your theory of language evolution depends on 
your theory of language", a phrase straightforwardly chosen as the title of the article . 
According to him, researchers within the MP are committed to a saltationist scenario. 
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Taking for granted that the MP requires Merge as well as lexical items in order to 
operate, Jackendoff proposes three scenarios. The first, later proposed by Berwick 
and Chomsky (2011) is that lexical items came before Merge. Jackendoff (2010) 
argues that this cannot be the case, aptly remarking that many features are 
uninterpretable without a role in syntactic constructions. Undeniably certain feature 
complexes such as "transitive verb" are expressed only within a syntactic 
construction: "These syntactic aspects of the lexicon are cognitively useful only if 
there are syntactic trees to insert lexical items into, so it is hard to imagine why or 
how they should have evolved prior to the advent of syntax." (ibid., p.70) Berwick 
and Chomsky's chronology thus proposes the appearance of features which make no 
behavioural difference without their interaction with Merge, making their evolution, 
as well as their spread within the population, highly unlikely. The second proposed 
scenario is that both Merge and lexical items appeared at once, the lexical features 
emerging perhaps 'for free ' through the interfaces to the CI and SM systems. 
According to Jackendoff this "seems equally hard to imagine" since many features 
are not properties of either of the interfaces (ibid., p.70). Finally the third scenario is 
that Merge appeared before the lexical features. Regarding this last proposai , 
Jackendoff argues that "it's hard to imagine how syntax [i .e. Merge as a linguistic 
mechanism] could work without these features, so it looks like they have to join 
recursion as part of the proposed single step." (ibid. , p.70) In other words, he does not 
believe that Merge could operate in any significant way without features on which to 
operate, and therefore a chronology whereby Merge appeared before lexical items is 
no more likely. 
Since Merge requires the lexical items in order to operate as a linguistic mechanism, 
and the lexical features require Merge in order to be expressed, neither is likely to 
have appeared and spread within the species before the other. Nevertheless, 
Jackendoff does offer the caveat that "I' 11 be the first to admit that finding something 
hard to imagine doesn't make it false" (ibid. , p. 70), granting that these scenarios are 
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not impossible, only very implausible. Consequently, according to Jackendoff, 
researchers within the MP are practically bound to a saltationist position, and the 
assumption that both Merge and lexical items appeared in a single step. 
3.7.4. Clark: a moderate approach 
Contrary to this, Clark (2013) argues that the MP is compatible with a gradualist 
approach to language evolution. Arguing explicitly against Jackendoff s (2010) 
article, Clark observes as Jackendoff did that "grammars developed within the 
minimalist program, even those of the most radical sort, contain at least two 
components: words (understood as bundles of syntactic features) and the recursive 
hierarchical operation Merge." (Clark, 2013, p. 188) Consequently, it is possible to 
posit a multi-step evolution, since more than one mechanism is needed to account for 
the language faculty. Clark further claims (with apparently no supporting argument 
contra Berwick & Chomsky, 2011) that externalization as well must be an evolved 
component, concluding that MP proposais for language evolution "must have 
involved at least the three steps" (Clark, 2013 , p. 190), which is to say the appearance 
of Merge, lexical items, and externalization. Y et despite the apparent necessity of 
various steps in Clark's account, his conclusion remains only that the MP can propose 
a gradualist account and is not bound to a saltationist scenario for language evolution, 
concluding that "your favoured theory of syntax does not determine your theory of 
syntactic evolution." (ibid., p. 191) 
3.7.5. The MP does not warrant saltationism 
Pushing Clark's argument further, I argue that Chomsky (and Berwick) need to 
abandon the saltationist position in favour of a gradualist account. As was shown in 
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this chapter, the entire saltationist argument essentially hinges on three premises: (1) 
that there exists a species-wide language faculty, (2) that there existed a human 
revolution, explainable only through the appearance of language, and (3) that Merge 
is the only mechanism which would have needed to evolve. Premise (1) is generally 
uncontroversial, but implies nothing with respect to the saltationist or gradualist 
account and can consequently be put aside. Regarding (2), no consensus exists for the 
human revolution hypothesis at once because the archaeological record is not so 
clear-cut, and because other factors , namely cultural development, could account for 
a sudden surge in technological complexity, implying that the impetus for the 
saltationist explanation is not very strong. But most importantly, premise (3), as 
pointed out in differing ways by Bickerton (2009b), Boeckx (2011), Jackendoff 
(2010) and Clark (2013), is simply false, since lexical items and lexical features also 
need to be accounted for when one takes at face value all the major mechanisms 
proposed within the MP. Finally, for some researchers saltationist events in evolution 
are thought to be the exception, and should typically be postulated only when there is 
significant empirical evidence to warrant them, which is not the case with language. 
If on the other hand we take for granted that saltations are more common, as certain 
other researchers .do, it still remains to be shown that the trait is so simple as to not 
allow intermediate steps, without which the assumption that it stems from a small 
genotype change is likely unwarranted. 
3.7.6. An alternative scenario 
Considering these points, it is far more reasonable, even from within the MP, to 
assume that language evolved through successive steps. 1 propose here a scenario for 
language evolution which adopts the mechanisms of the MP but shows how they 
could be used to advance a more plausible, gradualist and adaptationist account for 
language evolution. Of course this account is highly speculative and is shown here 
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merely as a way to demonstrate that far from the "simplest" account, Chomsky's 
scenario for language evolution disregards many of the interacting mechanisms he 
himself endorses in the MP, and how taking them into account could lead to a 
gradualist evolutionary story. My proposed chronology does not include dates and 
does not specify which parts stem from cultural developments and which parts are 
biological since these will need to be differentiated through neurobiological , genetic, 
and linguistic research. Notwithstanding this avowed ignorance, the adaptationist 
nature of the account implies that it is very reasonable to assume that there could have 
been many small successive steps to the biological evolution of the language faculty . 
The objective is thus not to convince the reader that this scenario is the true story of 
language evolution, but merely that Chomsky need not-and should not--confine 
himself to a saltationist scenario. 
Along the lines proposed by Boeckx (2011), a likely scenario is that Merge appeared 
very early in evolutionary history, being as it is a very simple combinatorial 
algorithm, probably shared with other species, suggesting conunon descent. However 
without lexical features, it does not produce recursive or hierarchically structured 
phrases, only combinations of concepts. The concepts themselves may have become 
combinable through a de-modularisation of the mind, an idea suggested by Mithen 
(1996), who argues that it is a crucial development in human cognition. Boeckx 
(2011) as well recruits this idea, claiming that "this ability of building bridges across 
modules is directly related to language, specifically the ability to lexicalize concepts 
(uprooting them from their modules) and combine them freely via Merge." (p. 59) 
This may also be related to Chomsky's non-referentialist claim with respect to lexical 
items, as a de-modularised mind may have gained the ability to apply concepts to 
other concepts without a necessary extemal reference relationship. For instance, 
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"lion" could corne to refer not to a specific lion in the world, but instead all the 
cognitive associations related to experiences of lions. 10 
Without features however the combinations of concepts would have been 
unconstrained, relying only on an interface to the CI system-in other words, the 
meaning of the concepts-ta warrant the pairing. The assumption therefore is that the 
interface to the CI system was already present since it too has antecedents in other 
species (Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002, p. 1573). No doubt the interface to the SM 
system as well was available, allowing crude sound-meaning pairs. These interfaces 
would have permitted feedback on the Merging of concepts since at the CI interface 
appropriate combinations lead to better planning and understanding, whereas at the 
SM interface more refined sound-meaning pairings would facilitate communication. 
This feedback would have led to the ' crystallisation' of semantic and phonetic 
features, transforming the pairings of concepts and their externalization from a more-
or-less affair into a precise and determined process. This would make the interfaces 
and systems more efficient and more precise. For the SM system at least this would 
allow for co-evolution of the phonetic features and the fine motor contrai necessary 
for articulation throughout the entire process of language evolution. This sort of 
development at the CI interface is more difficult to trace because its definition is far 
less precise, and knowledge of it is far more indirect. It is nevertheless likely that the 
same feedback between the CI system and Merge/lexical items would have happened, 
allowing greater cognitive power to develop. 
Once communication of the sort exists, language evolution can be framed in terms of 
niche construction theory (as Bickerton, 2009a has done): those individuals who 
10 Granted, this is a tenuous argument; but then aga in, the non-referentialist claim itself is also rather 
vague and imprecise. Until Chomsky's position can be clearly articulated and empirical evidence has 
corne to bear, it is difficult to understand quite what is needed to account for its evolution. 
98 
cannot communicate at the same level as the others will be less likely to participate 
effectively in group activities for sustenance (such as hunting and gathering), and 
could even be socially ostracized from mating. Because of this, there would be strong 
selection for linguistic and cognitive capacities, leading to increased refinement and 
complexity of these traits . 
Syntactic features would have developed at this point, perhaps through development 
and refinement of semantic features. Certain syntactic features seem to be loosely 
related to semantic requirements: for instance the det feature mentioned previously 
could corne out of the need to specify the number of objects one is talking about (a 
semantic requirement), later becoming a syntactic feature necessitating feature-
checking. It is thus easy to imagine a transfer from semantic to syntactic features, 
with the latter proliferating because of the structure and recursion that they allow in 
language. The labelling algorithm, or projection of the syntactic features during 
Merge, could have appeared separately as a way of allowing for larger syntactic 
constructions all the while preserving the structural dependence that cornes with 
syntactic features . Once these larger sentences can be constructed, suppression of 
duplicates during extemalization would become advantageous for the same reasons 
Chomsky evoked, which is to say the reduction of the computational Joad associated 
with fine motor contrai. With all these mechanisms in place, the language faculty is 
essentially what it currently is, barring the possibility of additional fine -tuning to the 
lexical features, interfaces and CI and SM systems. 
This is merely a plausible scenario considering the premises studied here, and taking 
for granted that the mechanisms proposed by the MP are indeed those of the actual 
language faculty. Note that such an evolutionary history could be compatible with a 
"human revolution" insofar as niche construction could account for very strong 
selection forces, driving rapid (albeit graduai) evolution. There remain problems of 
course, such as what may have been the selection pressures and novelties that pushed 
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for the initial de-modularisation of the mind, and whether and how the semantic, 
phonetic and syntactic features all stem from the same genotype, not to mention all 
the details surrounding the mechanisms within the CI and SM systems. Y et despite 
these shortcomings, the scenario proposed has the advantage over Chomsky' s of 
including all the mechanisms taken to be necessary for language within the MP, and 
showing how they need not have appeared all at once, or for completely unknown 
reasons. 
3 .8. Conclusion 
Chomsky and Berwick' s account of the evolution of the language faculty draws from 
research in paleoanthropology, archaeology, evolutionary biology, and heavily on the 
findings of the MP. Yet their premises are not always as solid as these authors seem 
to believe, and the concl.usions they draw are more often than not faulty. The most 
significant problem cornes from their own field, and is the omission of an explanation 
for the evolution of lexical units . Even more problematic is the omission of any 
mention of lexical features , despite the fact that they are essential to linguistic 
phenomena and even recursion itself. It is the exclusion of features which allows 
them to posit the saltationist and non-adaptationist scenario; including them in the 
evolution of the language faculty radically changes the picture, rendering the 
saltationist approach highly implausible, and a gradualist scenario far more likely. As 
such, the saltationist approach advocated by Chomsky and Berwick fails because of 
the omission of crucial elements from their own research in linguistics: saltationism is 
therefore not supported by current linguistic theories within the MP. 
As previously mentioned, acceptance of the MP is by no means unanimous within 
linguistics or evolutionary linguistics, and would benefit from a more rigorous 
account of the evolution of language if it means to convince more researchers of its 
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validity. In light of this, and as illustrated by the proposed gradualist scenârio, if the 
MP is to contribute in a meaningful way to research in language evolution, a greater 
emphasis will need to be placed upon elucidating the details of words, concepts, · 
lexical items and lexical features, as well as the relationships between all these, thus 
covering one of the most egregious lacunas in evolutionary accounts proposed by 
Chomsky and some of his collaborators. 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this research was to describe and critique Chomsky' s thoughts 
regarding language evolution, from their first explicit formulation in Hauser, 
Chomsky & Fitch (2002), to the latest publications. As was shown, all these articles 
have significant problems once the concepts and arguments they rely on are carefully 
unpacked and understood. 
HCF (2002) suffers from a few significant setbacks, most notably with respect to 
recursion. Although put forward as the central property of language and the only 
component within FLN ( along with the interfaces to the systems), recursion remained 
undefined in the article. Moreover, since recursion is a property and not an algorithm 
unto itself, claiming that it is the sole property of FLN raises the problem of defining 
just what algorithm instantiates the recursion. In other words, if the claim was that 
FLN contains a recursive algorithm, then that algorithm needs to be specified since 
such algorithms can be vastly different, especially when the definition of recursion 
remains open for interpretation. 
Chomsky subsequently published papers on language evolution in which a specific 
recursive algorithm is proposed for FLN. Leaning on research within the Minimalist 
Program, Chomsky (2010; Berwick & Chomsky, 2011) proposes that Merge is the 
only syntactic operator necessary for inclusion in FLN. Chomsky furthermore takes 
for granted the existence of a "human revolution" sometime around 75 000 years ago, 
and that it could only be accounted for through the emergence of language brought 
about by a biological change. These premises led him to posit a saltationist scenario 
in which the language faculty appeared in a single step, with the appearance of Merge 
through a rewiring of the brain, perhaps due to a minor mutation. This language 
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faculty recruited the pre-existing CI and SM systems, with externalization 
(communication) appearing later, through no biological evolution. 
Y et as was shown, this scenario is problematic for two main reasons. The first is that 
the human revolution may not be relevant to language evolution, either because the 
technological progression associated with it may in fact have been graduai- a claim 
to be sorted out by paleoanthropologists-or because a period of great technological 
innovation could be explained by other factors, such as cultural development or other 
biological changes that are not related to language. The second and more significant 
problem is that the saltationist approach is realistic only insofar as it ignores the 
significant role played by lexical items and lexical features within the syntactic 
process. Merge on its own does not account for the formation of all and only well-
formed sentences, nor even does it account for recursion itself. By failing to explain 
how and when lexical items, and more specifically lexical features, have evolved, 
Chomsky leaves a significant, perhaps even the most significant, aspect of the faculty 
of language out of the picture. With lexical items and features included, the 
saltationist scenario becomes incredibly unlikely, depending as it does on the idea 
that the language faculty could hinge on a single language-specific element, namely 
Merge. 
1 have proposed an alternative scenario for language evolution that takes into account 
the bulk of linguistic mechanisms proposed within the MP, but is nevertheless 
graduai. It is of course highly speculative and should be taken not as claim regarding 
how the evolution of language truly did happen, but merely as a demonstration that 
Chomsky need not limit his research into language evolution to a saltationist 
approach. This research thus opens up possibilities for investigations into gradualist 
accounts of language evolution for the MP. It also demonstrates that, should 
researchers within the MP want to contribute meaningfully to an evolutionary account 
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of language evolution, more research will be needed regarding the origin and role of 
lexical features. 
Finally, this research has not touched upon many interesting and related issues which 
could have a significant impact on the MP and its involvement in language evolution 
debates. For instance, the emphasis on optimality within the faculty of language has 
peculiar consequences when applied to language evolution: in Chomsky' s approach, 
it was the driving force behind the justification of a saltationist scenario. But is this 
optimality truly a good way of approaching reconciliation with biology? Boeckx 
(2011) points out that "it is emphatically not the sort of optimization that ultra-
Darwinists like Dawkins advocate" (p. 56). It is instead the sort that is thought to 
stem from principles of physics or chemistry ("laws of nature" as Berwick & 
Chomsky put it: 2011 , p. 30)), not biology. Among others, "principles of structural 
architecture and developmental constraints" (Chomsky, 2005 , p. 6) are thought to 
fashion the language faculty, making its optimality something more akin to "a 
snowflake" (Chomsky, 2010; p. 59) than a biological organ. Researchers within the 
MP (Chomsky, 2010; Boeckx, 2011 ; Berwick & Chomsky, 2011) often call upon 
findings in evolutionary developmental ( evo-devo) biology to justify such claims but 
it is not clear that the parallels are justified (c.f. Benitez-Burraco & Longa, 2010). 
Needless to say, these issues relate directly to language evolution and the MP, and 
warrant further investigation. 
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